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A woman from the Philippines was abused by her United States
citizen spouse. He threatened to have immigration authorites deport
her to the Philippines if she tried to leave him. She stayed. He later
cut her all over her back, head, and hands with a meat cleaver.'
An American citizen married a Polish woman and brought her to
the United States. Shortly after her arrival he began beating her.
She was afraid to go to the police 'because she feared deportation
and what her husband might do to her in the future.2
A woman from China came to the United States to marry, but her
husband refused to file a petition so she could become a permanent
resident. He was very violent and she suffered physical injuries from
his abuse. As a result she is separated from her husband and
undocumented. 3
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1. National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (May 17, 1989) (compilation of
situations of entrapment of battered alien spouses) (available from author).
2. Hearings on Legal Immigration Reform, Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 1st Sess., 665-68 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of the Honorable Lou-
ise Slaughter, member of Congress).
3. C. HOGELAND & R. ROSEN, DREAMS LOST, DREAMS FOUND; UNDOCUMENTED
WOMEN IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY (1990) (Survey Project of the Coalition for Im-
migrant and Refugee Rights, and Services Immigrant Women's Task Force).
A Dominican woman fled from her United States citizen hus-
band's violent assaults only after being in the hospital for the fifth
time as a result of his beatings. Her husband bashed her head
against the wall and threatened to kill her if she told her doctor what
happened. She had been afraid to leave him because he controlled
her immigration status.4
A Chinese woman married an American citizen. Within a month
of her arrival in the United States, her husband threatened her with
a gun and subjected her to repeated physical abuse. She did not ini-
tially leave because she feared deportation and physical reprisal and
could not speak enough English to gain information about her legal
rights. After being repeatedly threatened with a gun, however, she
sought help from a battered woman's shelter in New York. Later,
during divorce proceedings, she discovered that her citizen husband
had previously married two other alien wives who both had been
deported.
5
A woman from Ecuador married a United States citizen. He never
filed a petition for her to become a permanent resident. She became
pregnant and he battered her throughout the pregnancy. Another
pregnant woman who already had one citizen child was also physi-
cally abused by her American spouse. Her husband refused to file a
petition to obtain permanent resident sthtus for her. She feared that
initiating a divorce would lead to loss of custody of her citizen chil-
dren because her husband threatened a custody battle. 6
The mother of two citizen children was abandoned by her United
States citizen husband. Because her husband never filed a petition
for her legal immigration status, she was undocumented. He was
later incarcerated. Although she worked, her lack of legal status pre-
vented her from obtaining employment at a salary sufficient to fully
support her citizen children. As a consequence, the children received
supplemental assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program.7
Another spouse of a United States citizen and the mother of two
United States citizen children was ordered deported from the United
States. She had lived in the United States for more than seven years.
One of her citizen children had a serious speech defect that could
not be adequately treated in the mother's original country. But she
did not have legal status because her husband had been unwilling to
petition for her immigration status.8
, 4. Walt, Immigrant Abuse: Nowhere to Hide, Newsday (New York), December 2,
1990, at 8.
5. Hearings, supra note 2, at 667.
6. National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, supra note 1.
7. Complaint, Perales v. Meese, Civ. Action No. 226588 S.D.N.Y.
8. Holley v. INS, 727 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1984).
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These situations are a few of many9 that illustrate the conse-
quences of the legacies of coverture in the immigration law. The no-
tion of coverture, that a wife is subordinate to her husband and
under his control, was incorporated into the early immigration laws
and strengthened by the 1986 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments.' 0 This article details the history and impact of spouse domi-
nation in the immigration law and makes proposals for change.
First, the article describes the common law doctrine of coverture,
which gave control of a married woman's property and the custody
of the children of the marriage to her husband, and the subsidiary
doctrine of chastisement, which allowed wife abuse. It then summa-
rizes the domestic law's attempts to remove the notion of spousal
domination and address the prevalent problem of wife abuse.
Second, the article details the incorporation of the assumptions of
coverture into the early immigration laws and the failure of Con-
gress to remove coverture premises from recent immigration legisla-
tion. It demonstrates how Congress's attempts to remove sex dis-
crimination from the immigration law in the 1950s and 1960s were
flawed because the legislature never fully confronted the conse-
quences of the initial incorporation of the premises of coverture into
the immigration law. It further describes how Congress substantially
strengthened the notion of spousal domination in 1986 through the
Marriage Fraud Amendments" and did not fully confront the conse-
quences of the law's imprimatur of spousal control in the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990.12
Next, the impact of the law's perpetuation of spouse domination is
9. See other situations in the compilation by National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, supra note 1; C. HOGELAND & R. ROSEN, supra note 3; and in Hearings, supra
note 2, at 666-68. Other organizations have reported similar incidents. The New York
Asian Women's Center reported working with more than a hundred battered alien
women whose husbands refused to cooperate with the joint petition process. National
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, supra note 1. The Hawaiian legal service, Na Loio
no na Kanaka, estimated that there were hundreds of female alien spouses in Hawaii
confronted with problems caused by the Marriage Fraud Act. Most were Korean, Fili-
pino, and Southeast Asian immigrant women. Most were married to U.S. servicemen.
Many were subject to physical abuse, intimidation, and exploitation. They lived with the
terror of facing deportation or continuing an abusive relationship. Na Loio no na Kan-
aka, November 23, 1988. The Center for Immigrants' Rights in New York City spon-
sored a training program for battered women's advocates on June 19, 1990, at which
instances of spouses abusing their alien wives were related to the author.
10. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100
Stat. 3537 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
if. Id.
12. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
described. The article shows that the immigrants harmed by the
spouse domination perpetuated by the law are overwhelmingly
women. This is because women have been the majority of spouse-
based immigrants, the historical target of subordination because of
sex, and the majority of abused spouses in the United States. It fur-
ther shows how the law's imposition of spouse domination has led to
serious harm for citizen children and also adversely impacts on U.S.
society as a whole.
This article then proposes legislative and administrative changes to
address the legacies of coverture in the immigration law. These pro-
posals mitigate the spouse domination in the immigration law, but
take into account the political reality of legislative attempts to pre-
vent fraud.
II. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF COVERTURE AND THE
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW'S RESPONSE
A. The Coverture Doctrine
In his Commentaries on the Law of England, Blackstone states:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the mar-
riage, or at least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband;
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is
therefore called ... a feme-covert,... is said to be covert-baron, or under
the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her
condition during her marriage is called her coverture. 13
Under the doctrine of coverture, a wife could not make a contract
with her husband or with others. She could not engage in litigation.
She could not sue or be sued without joining her husband. She could
not sue her husband at all. She could not make a will. The personal
property which a woman owned before marriage and that she ac-
quired during the marriage became her husband's property. A hus-
band had the use of his wife's real property during the marriage. If
the marriage produced a child, the husband was entitled to the rents
and profits of the wife's property during the husband's life.14 The
husband was the sole guardian of the couple's children.'
Under the English common law, the allegiance of a wife to her
husband was analogous to a subject's allegiance to the King. For
example, a wife who killed her husband was guilty of more than
homicide. She had committed the crime of petit treason and there-
fore could be punished by being first dragged behind a horse and
13. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *443.
14. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE U.S. § 8.1, at 500 (2nd
ed. 1987).
15. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW 561 (1975).
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then burned at the stake.16 While the basis of the creation of the
United States of America was the rejection of monarchial tyranny,
coverture's absolute rule of husband over wife became part of the
American law.
17
The coverture doctrine thus did two things. First, it established the
notion of spousal domination and control. A married couple was not
viewed as two co-equal parties. Rather, one spouse was legally given
absolute power over the other. Second, the coverture doctrine gave
all the power to the male spouse.
B. The Right of Chastisement
A husband's total control over his wife's livelihood, home, and
children created a coercive situation which was reflected in a subsidi-
ary doctrine, the right of "chastisement." This kind of control over
activity, livelihood and children established by coverture carried with
it the power to enforce that control. In describing coverture, Black-
stone speaks about a husband's right of "chastisement" to restrain
his wife from "misbehavior."' 8 There is some controversy over
whether the common law right of chastisement afforded a legal privi-
lege for a husband to beat his wife. One position is that at common
law the husband had a right to beat his wife so long as he used a
stick that was no larger than his thumb,"9 but others doubted that
the common law gave such overt permission for wife battering." The
American courts reflected this ambivalence, with some courts up-
holding a husband's right to use force2 and others rejecting it.
22
It is, however, undisputed that the American common law failed
to protect wives from injury by their husbands. A wife could not sue
her husband in tort for injuries caused by him. She had no resources
with which to escape her husband's abuse, as all her property was
16. M. Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 1657, 1659 (1981).
17. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB; BATTERED
WOMEN AND THE ADMINSITRATION OF JUSTICE (1982) [hereinafter U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS]; H. CLARK, supra note 14, at 498-502.
18. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *444.
19. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 2; Comment,
Spouse Abuse: A Novel Remedy for a Historic Problem, 84 DICK. L. REV. 147, 151
(1979). See also Comment, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Potential Defense to a
Homicide Charge, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 213, 214 (1978).
20. H. CLARK, supra note 14, § 8.3 at 526.
21. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156 (1824); State v. Black, 60 N.C. 262
(Win. 266) (1864).
22. See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 146-47 (1871).
under his control. Further, turning to the courts for protection was
futile, as an 1868 North Carolina case illustrates. 23 In that case, the
court asserted that a husband did not have any right to whip his
wife. However, the court upheld the husband's acquittal of the
charge of assault and battery on his wife because the court could
"not interfere with family government in trifling cases. "24
C. Attempts to Legislatively Remove and Reject the Premises of
Coverture and Chastisement
In the middle of the nineteenth century, state legislatures began to
enact statutes that reduced the legal disabilities of married women.25
These statutes, generally known as Married Women's Property Acts,
gave women greater control over the raising of children and the dis-
position of family wealth. 28 By the turn of the century, all states had
versions of such statutes and subsequently additional laws were
passed that specified the removal of married women's legal disabili-
ties.17 These laws afforded married women rights including: the right
to joint custody of children;28 the right to sue and be sued; the right
to contract; and the right to own and control real and personal
property.29
Attempts to correct the legacies of the "chastisement" component
of coverture Were not made until much later. Assault had long been
defined as a crime and no American jurisdiction had promulgated a
statutory defense based on the fact that the victim was a spouse.30
However, statutes and case law did not begin to address the problem
of wife abuse until the legislators and courts looked beyond these
facially neutral and seemingly sufficient laws and confronted histori-
cal and social fact.
In the 1970s and 1980s the women's movement brought attention
to the issue of battered women. 31 Many studies demonstrated the
23. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (1868).
24. Id. at 459. For a description of how this attitude continued and barred battered
women frori seeking assistance of the courts, see Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc.2d 1047, 396
N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st Dept.
1978), a~fd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901, 393 N.E.2d 976 (1979), appeal denied,
48 N.Y.2d 6566, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1032, 396 N.E.2d 488 (1979).
25. H. CLARK supra note 14, § 8.1, at 503.
26. However, one commentator concludes that these changes did not seriously
challenge the separate domestic sphere of married women. See Chused, Married
Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEo. L. J. 1359, 1425 (1983).
27. H. CLARK, supra note 14, § 8.1, at 503.
28. Id. at 503.
29. See id. at 503 n.4 for list of state statutes. See also id. at 507-23 for a sum-
mary of current law. The law of domicile, however, is not quite as settled. See H. KAY,
SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION 204, 205 (1988).
30. M. Marcus, supra note 16, at 1657, 1662.
31. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From The
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
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extensive incidence of spouse abuse in American society 2 and con-
cluded that the overwhelming majority of victims were women. 33
Furthermore, the impact of the legacy of coverture on the attitude of
government officials, e.g., police, prosecutors and judges, was recog-
nized. The notion of a husband as king of his castle with a right to
control his home and family life had resulted in the refusal of offi-
cials to enforce laws prohibiting assault when a husband assaulted
his wife.34 These realizations led to government recognition of its re-
sponsibility to remove the societal permission for wife battering.
Laws were passed to protect the abused and change the social mes-
sage to convey that violence against a spouse is not sanctioned. Gen-
erally these laws are not sex specific; i.e., they do not prohibit wife
abuse, but spouse abuse. However, they confront a problem which
most frequently adversely impacts on women.
While there are still several gaps in these efforts, particularly with
regard to funding for programs and the implementation of remedies
for battered spouses,36 many changes have been made. States have
passed laws that seek to protect the abused by providing for civil
orders of protection that can be obtained by a battered spouse to
order a batterer to stop abuse and leave the" marital home.36 States
have provided criminal sanctions, including mandatory arrest, for vi-
olation of these orders.37 Class action cases forced law enforcement
officials to use existing criminal laws to arrest batterers.3 s Under
some state laws, battered spouses can go into court and request the
criminal prosecution of their batterers3 9 Some states have provided
funds for battered women's shelters and services.40 States have abol-
32. H. CLARK, supra note 14, § 8.3, at 525.
33. Id.; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 17, at v.
34. M. Marcus, supra note 16, at 1659-60; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 17, at v.; G. GOOLKASUAN, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES (U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of
Justice, 1986).
35. NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, WOMEN BATTERING: THE
FACTS (1989); see also NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, ARREST IN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: A STATE BY STATE SUMMARY (1987) [hereinafter ARREST
IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES]; US. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 17, at
82.
36. G. GOOLKASUAN, supra note 34, at 5.
37. ARREST IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES, supra note 35.
38. See, e.g., Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc.2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1977), rev'd, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st Dept. 1978), affd, 47 N.Y.2d 582,
419 N.Y.S.2d 901, 393 N.E.2d 976 (1979), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 6566, 421
N.Y.S.2d 1032, 396 N.E.2d 488 (1979).
39. G. GOOLKASUAN, supra note 34, at 5.
40. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 82.
ished interspousal immunity, thus paving the way for battered
spouses to use tort remedies for injuries sustained from beatings by
their spouses.4 1 The federal government has sponsored reports that
have suggested reforms in state law.4 2 Additionally, Congress has
passed two statutes that provide funds for battered spouses and the
programs that assist them, the Family Violence Prevention and Ser-
vices Act 43 and the Victim Compensation and Assistance Act.
4
These developments demonstrate a rejection of the assumptions of
coverture and an acknowledgment of the legislative responsibility for
removing the social legacies of this doctrine. The laws addressing
married women's rights and spouse abuse communicate that a mar-
ried woman has a right to control her own property and livelihood,
have custody of her children, and live free from abuse. The immigra-
tion laws, on the other hand, continue to promote the assumptions of
coverture and have not fully communicated an intolerance of spouse
abuse.
III. THE INCORPORATION AND PERPETUATION OF COVERTURE IN
THE IMMIGRATION LAW
A. Early Immigration Laws: The Incorporation of Coverture
The premises underlying the coverture doctrine were incorporated
into the initial laws controlling immigration status. From the incep-
tion, immigration laws incorporated and enforced the notion of
spousal domination and gave the control and power to the male
spouse. A Congressional report stated that early immigration laws
contained "a legislative enactment of the common-law theory that
the husband is the head of the household."145 The history of the im-
migration laws confirms that conclusion. Both alien and citizen
women were disadvantaged. Male citizens and resident aliens were
given the right to control the immigration status of their alien wives.
Before any immigration benefit could attach to an immigrant wife,
her husband had to petition for her or she had to accompany him.
The alien woman's immigration status depended on her husband's
actions. Citizen or resident alien women did not have the same right
as their male counterparts to petition for their male alien spouses.
Male spouses could not gain immigration status by accompanying
their citizen wives. These restrictions incorporated the assumptions
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F (1977).
42. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 17; DEPARTMENT OF
JUsTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT
(1984); G. GOOLKASUAN, supra note 34.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 10410 (Supp. V 1987).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (Supp. V 1987).
45. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 414 (1951).
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of coverture, that a wife was under the control and authority of her
husband and subservient to him.
The immigration law's imposition of the subordination of a wife to
her husband was evident in the laws that governed the admission of
immigrants from the beginning of restrictions on immigration. In the
first hundred years of the existence of the United States, there were
very minimal restrictions on immigration .4 Between 1875 and 1917
laws were passed41 that excluded aliens with certain characteristics
from entry into the United States, such as convicts, prostitutes, per-
sons with contagious diseases, and persons who' were illiterate.4 8
However, male citizens and male resident aliens were given the right
to have exemptions from some of these exclusion grounds made for
their alien wives.
A 1903 statute provided that certain residents of the United
States could send for their alien wives and have them admitted to
the United States, even if they had a contagious disease, if it was
curable or not dangerous. 49 The 1917 act continued this exemption
to the contagious disease ground of exclusion. It also provided that
the wife of a citizen or admissible alien sent for by her husband
would not be excluded because she could not read, if she were other-
wise admissible. 50 The 1917 act barred the immigration of persons
from a geographical area called the Asiatic zone. 51 Exceptions in-
cluded government officials, professional people and missionaries and
their accompanying wives, but not their husbands.5
In the 1920's, the first numerical restrictions were imposed on im-
migration. This law restricted the number of aliens who could immi-
grate into the United States, i.e., those aliens who could become per-
manent residents of the United States with the right to live and work
in the United States and eventually become eligible for naturaliza-
46. An example is the short lived Alien and Sedition Act, Act of June 25, 1798,
ch. LVIII, 1 Stat. 570.
47. In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which suspended Chinese
immigration and made the Chinese ineligible for citizenship. This act, the first of the
nation's racist restrictive immigration laws, was not repealed until 1943. (Chinese Exclu-
sion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, Pub. L.
No. 199, 57 Stat. 600.)
48. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477; Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22
Stat. 214; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084; Act of March 3, 1903, Pub. L.
No. 162, 32 Stat. 1213; Act of Oct. 16, 1918, Pub. L. No. 221, 40 Stat. 1012.
49. Act of March 3, 1903, Pub. L. No. 162, 637, 32 Stat. 1213, 1221.
50. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, 63, 39 Stat. 874, 877.
51. Id. at 876.
52. Id. at 876-77.
tion.5' The immigration law continued to incorporate the assump-
tions of coverture. It gave the power over a wife's immigration status
to her husband by requiring that the husband file a petition for his
wife, or that she accompany him before she could obtain immigrant
status. It further did not allow the immigration of the husbands of
female citizens and resident aliens on the same basis as the wives of
male citizens and resident aliens.
In 1921, temporary numerical restrictions on immigration were
enacted. 54 In 1924, Congress made numerical limitations on immi-
gration permanent.5 However, certain persons were designated as
"non-quota" immigrants and exempt from numerical limitations.
The definition of non-quota immigrant included the wife of a United
States citizen.56 However, the citizen husband controlled the immi-
gration status of his alien wife. The alien wife would not be desig-
nated as non-quota immigrant unless her citizen husband had filed a
petition for her.57 Non-quota immigrants also included the accompa-
nying wives of immigrants born in the Western Hemisphere, minis-
ters, and professors. 58
The 1924 law further provided that certain preferences would be
given in the issuance of immigrant visas to aliens subject to numeri-
cal limitations. While the wife of a United States citizen was not
subject to any quota, the husband of a United States citizen was
subject to numerical limitation and given a preference if the United
States citizen wife was at least twenty-one years old.59 Another pref-
erence applied to "a quota immigrant who [was] skilled in agricul-
ture, and his accompanying wife and dependent children."'
The 1924 law established national quotas based on the population
of that nationality in the United States in 1890. This resulted in very
few places available for aliens born in southern and eastern Eu-
rope.61 Thus, the ability to fit under quotas of other nationalities was
important. Under the 1924 law, the wife, but not the husband, of an
alien of a different nationality could enter the country under the
53. Act of May 29, 1921, Pub. L. No. 5, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5.
54. Id. The 1921 law provided that in the enforcement of the numerical quotas,
preference was to be given to the wives, but not the husbands, of U.S. citizens and cer-
tain resident aliens. Id. at § 2(d).
55. Act of May 26, 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159.
56. Id. § 6(a), at 155. However, if the alien wife was ineligible for citizenship, i.e.,
Chinese, her citizen husband could not secure her immigration. See Gudendelsberger,
Implementing Family Unification Rights in American Immigration Law: Proposed
Amendments, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 253, 255-56 (1988); Chinese Exclusion Act of May
6, 1882, supra note 47.
57. Act of May 26, 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, § 4(a), 43 Stat 155.
58. Id. § 4(c)-(d), at 155.
59. Id. § 6(a)(1), at 155.
60. Id. § 6(a)(2), at 155.
61. Id. § 11, at 159.
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quota for her husband's nationality, if the quota for her nationality
was full. 62 The statute also provided an exception to its exclusion of
aliens ineligible for citizenship for the wife, but not the husband, of
an admissible immigrant.6"
In the 1930s and 1940s some changes were made that addressed
the immigration law's treatment of female United States citizens
and residents with alien husbands. However, the law's basic notion
that one spouse was dominant, and therefore rightfully controlled the
other spouse's immigration status was never confronted and rejected.
Even the changes that focused on the immigration of the husbands
of female citizens and aliens were made in parsimonious steps. In
1932, an alien husband of a United States citizen became eligible for
admission into the United States as a non-quota immigrant, but only
if the marriage occurred prior to July 1, 1932.64 In 1948, Congress
addressed this restriction and considered the position that "an alien
husband of an American citizen should have the same status under
our immigration laws as is enjoyed by an alien wife of an American
citizen, irrespective of the date of marriage of the alien husband to
the citizen wife."65 The House Judiciary 'Committee found such a
suggestion "unwise," pending the completion of an investigation and
study of the entire immigration system, and recommended only that
the husbands of United States citizens be considered non-quota im-
migrants if the marriage took place prior to January 1, 1948.66 This
recommendation was enacted in May of 1948 and became law.
67
B. The Immigration Laws of 1952 and 1965: Flawed Attempts
to Remove Coverture Premises
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the basis for cur-
rent immigration law, consolidated and modified prior immigration
laws.68 In 1950, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported on its in-
vestigation of the immigration system which led to the passage of the
1952 Act.69 The report examined the issue of inequality of the sexes
62. Id. § 12(a)(2), at 160.
63. Id. § 13(c)(2), at 162.
64. Act of July 11, 1932, Pub. L. No. 277, § 4(a), 47 Stat. 656.
65. S. REP. No. 1206, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADNMN. NEWS 1555-56.
66. Id. at 1556.
67. Act of May 19, 1948, Pub. L. No. 538, § 4(a), 62 Stat. 241.
68. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 166.
69. S. REP. No. 1514, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
under the immigration law.70 It concluded that "there is no justifica-
tion for according different treatment to the sexes under the immi-
gration laws," and the committee recommended that "the laws be
amended to remove all such inequalities."7 1 However, the steps taken
in the 1952 Immigration Act and subsequent immigration laws did
not address the real problem. They did not reject the basic notion of
coverture, that one spouse controls all aspects of the other spouse's
life. They merely changed the word, wife, to the word, spouse. Thus,
while the law appeared facially neutral, in reality, it continued the
notion of spousal domination and control.
Under the 1952 statute, non-quota immigrants included the
spouses, and not just the wives, of United States citizens. Also in-
cluded as non-quota immigrants were Western Hemisphere-born im-
migrants, ministers, and certain alien employees of the United States
and their accompanying spouses, not just wives.72 Similarly, the
spouses, not just the wives, of permanent residents were given a pref-
erence under the quota system. 73 Furthermore, the provisions of the
law that determined to which quota an immigrant could be charged
were changed. The 1952 law provided that either spouse, not just the
wife, could be charged to the spouse's nationality quota if necessary
to prevent the couple's separation.74
However, the provisions of the 1924 law which had placed an alien
wife's immigratiofn status under her husband's control still remained.
For an alien spouse to be granted status as an immigrant, it was not
sufficient that the alien had in good faith entered into a bona fide
marriage with a United States citizen or resident alien. The citizen
or resident spouse had to file a petition requesting that the alien
spouse be designated as an immigrant. Whether the alien spouse
would acquire a legal immigration status was thus left in the citizen
or resident spouse's power. 5
The reports leading up to the passage of the 1952 immigration
laws7" were the last instances of serious Congressional attention to
the issue of sex discrimination in the context of the immigration
laws." Congress apparently believed it had solved the problem. In
70. Id. at 414.
71. Id. at 417.
72. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 101(a)(27), 66
Stat. 166.
73. Id. § 203(a)(3).
74. Id. § 202(a)(2).
75. Id. §§ 204, 205.
76. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82nd
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1653.
77. In 1986, a provision of the law that discriminated against men was changed.
The definition of child was changed to recognize a bona fide parent-child relationship
between a father and his illegitimate. child where prior law had recognized only the
mother in relationship to an illegitimate child. 100 Stat. 3359, 3439, 8 U.S.C. §
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1952, a Congressional report asserted that the proposed 1952 law
removed sex discrimination from the immigration laws .7 The report
also asserted that the bill "[e]liminates race as a bar to immigra-
tion."79 The Congressional belief in 1952 that it had removed the
racism and sexism incorporated into earlier immigration laws was
mistaken.
In 1965 Congress recognized the lingering racism in the immigra-
tion law and made major reforms, primaily to remove the racial and
ethnic discrimination of the 1952 Act's national origins quota sys-
tem.80 The 1965 Act changed the immigration system from one
which promoted the immigration of certain racial or ethnic groups to
one which was based on family relationship and the unfulfilled labor
needs of United States business.8'
Under the 1965 Act, spouse-based immigration was a substantial
part of immigration based in family relationship. "Immediate rela-
tives" of United States citizens were allowed to immigrate without
regard to any numerical quotas. 2 The definition of "immediate rela-
tive" included the spouse of a U.S. citizen.83 Numerical quotas were
imposed on other immigrants. 84 These quotas were distributed ac-
cording to a preference system which also favored family relation-
ships. 85 The second preference included the spouses of legal perma-
nent residents."
Even though the 1965 law favored immigration based on family
relationships, in which spouse-based immigration played a large
part, Congress did not confront the historical sexism of marriage
based immigration. To the contrary, the 1965 Act continued the
spousal control underlying coverture's discrimination against women.
1101(b)(1)(D) (1988).
78. In this report, which accompanied the House's bill that eventually became the
1952 immigration law, the Committee on the Judiciary stated that the bill "[elliminates
discrimination between sexes." H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 76, at 1679.
79. Id.
80. H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3328, 3333, 3350.
Furthermore, out of sensitivity to the racist history of the immigration laws, proposals for
post-1965 reforms have been examined to ascertain whether they would have a racially
or ethnically discriminatory impact, even if they do not include explicitly racist provi-
sions. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1206, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
81. Act of October 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 236, 79 Stat. 911.
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)-(b) (1988).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1988).
84. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), 1153(a) (1988).
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1988).
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1988).
The citizen or resident spouse's control over the immigration status
of his alien spouse found in the 1965 Act continues in current immi-
gration law. In 1965 and currently, an alien spouse cannot gain legal
immigration status unless the citizen or resident spouse files a peti-
tion.8 The citizen or resident can withdraw the petition8 and a de-
nial of the petition can be appealed only by the citizen or resident.89
An alien spouse has no control over her immigration status even if
she married a citizen or resident spouse in good faith, is living with
him, and has a child with him.
In the 1965 Act, Congress did add a provision that stated, "no
person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated
against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of his race, sex,
nationality, place of birth, or place of residence."'90 However, the dis-
cussion in the reports, hearings, and debates leading up to the enact-
ment of this provision focused on the removal of the national origin
discrimination in the immigration law. Sex was added without
comment.91
C. The 1986 Immigration Law Amendments: The Strengthening
of the Legacies of Coverture
In 1986, Congress made several changes in the immigration law.
One change was the enactment of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986.92 This law substantially added to the control
of a citizen or resident spouse over his alien spouse's immigration
status. It allowed the citizen or resident's actions to affect whether
his spouse continued to maintain legal status after it was initially
obtained. Loss of legal immigration status establishes the basis for
deportation.93 Even before deportation is effectuated, under another
1986 change, control over immigration status means control over
ability to work in the United States. 4
Prior to the passage of the 1986 law, the Commissioner of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) asserted there was
substantial fraud in immigration cases based on marriage and there-
87. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a) (West Supp. 1991).
88. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(1) (1991).
89. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(4) (1991).
90. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911, codified in 8 U.S.C. §
1152(a) (1988).
91. H.R. REP. No. 745, supra note 80.
92. Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended with scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C.).
93. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1991).
94. Under the employer sanctions provision of the immigration law, an employer is
required to check the citizenship or alien status of employees to assure that they have a
status that permits work. Employers can be fined or jailed for hiring an unauthorized
alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1988). See, e.g., Newsday (New York), June 28, 1990, at 8,
col. 1, for a description of the difficulty faced by undocumented aliens in finding a job.
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fore requested several changes in the law relating to marriage-based
immigration.9" When the INS study upon which the contentions of
marriage fraud abuse was based was eventually disclosed after the
passage of the Marriage Fraud Act, it was shown to have several
serious flaws.96 Nevertheless, the assertions of the existence of wide-
spread fraud had already been accepted by Congress and significant
changes had been made to the immigration law.
The 1986 law continued the initial power of a citizen or a perma-
nent resident spouse over the alien spouse's immigration status by
allowing the alien spouse to become a legal permanent resident only
if the United States citizen or resident spouse petitioned for her.
97
However, the Immigration Marriage Fraud Act went much further
by giving the citizen or resident spouse control over the continuation
of legal immigration status of the alien spouse who had already be-
come a permanent resident."8
Prior to 1986, an alien who became a permanent resident was al-
lowed to continue in that status. The 1986 amendments imposed a
conditional status on any alien whose immigration status was based
on a marriage to a United States citizen or resident alien that was
less than two years old.99 The conditional residence status lasts for
two years from the time the alien gains that status. 00
The alien spouse's status automatically terminates if a joint peti-
tion by both spouses is not submitted to the INS ninety days before
the expiration of the alien spouse's two year conditional status. 1 1
Upon termination of her status, the alien spouse becomes a deport-
able alien and loses her right to live and work in the United
States."o2
95. Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements to Obtain Permanent Resi-
dent Immigration Status: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee
Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-22 [hereinafter
Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements] (Statement of Alan C. Nelson, Com-
missioner of the INS).
96. INS Reveals Basis for Fraud Claims, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 26-27
(1988).
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1) (1988).
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (1988).
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1186(a)(1), (g)(1) (1988).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1186(a)(1), (c)(1)(A), (d)(2). The conditional time is based on
when the status is acquired, not when the marriage took place. Therefore, the qualifying
marriage has to endure more than two years.
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2) (1988). If within the two year time period the mar-
riage is judicially annulled or terminated, or the Attorney General determines that the
marriage was entered into fraudulently or for a fee, the Attorney General is directed to
terminate the resident status of the alien spouse. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1) (1988).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(D) (1988).
For an alien spouse's conditional status to become permanent,
both spouses must jointly submit the petition and additionally appear
at a subsequently scheduled interview with an INS official. They
must demonstrate that the marriage was not entered into for the
purpose of procuring the alien's entry into the United States as an
immigrant, that no fee was paid for the filing of a petition for the
alien spouse, and that the marriage has not been judicially annulled
or terminated.10 3 If a favorable determination is made after the in-
terview, the alien spouse's conditional status is removed and she is
granted permanent resident status. If an unfavorable determination
is made, she loses legal status and the ability to work in the United
States and becomes deportable.1
04
The loss of immigration status affects others besides the alien
spouse. Her sons or daughters, whose resident status was initially
based on her marriage, would also lose immigration status. Any son
or daughter of an alien spouse whose immigration status is based on
his or her parent's marriage is afforded only conditional permanent
resident status.105 The son or daughter's conditional status termi-
nates if the parent's status terminates and becomes permanent only
if the parent's status becomes permanent. 106
Furthermore, the alien spouse and her children cannot apply to
make their status in the United States permanent on any other basis.
A conditional permanent resident who qualifies for permanent resi-
dent status on another basis, e.g. special employment related skills, is
precluded from adjusting her status to permanent resident on the
alternative basis.
10 7
The 1986 Marriage Fraud Amendments thus gave the citizen or
resident spouse enormous power over the alien spouse. He controls
whether she and her children can stay, live, and work in the United
States. He can make his spouse and her children illegal aliens by
refusing to initially file a petition for her, by refusing to file a peti-
tion to remove her conditional status, or by refusal to appear at an
interview.
The 1986 Act contained two very limited discretionary waivers
which somewhat ameliorated the strictures of this power.108 Under
the 1986 law, an alien spouse could have requested that the Attorney
General transform her conditional status into permanent status, even
though she could not meet the joint petition and joint interview re-
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1) (1988). The interview requirement may be waived. 8
U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(3).
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3) (1988).
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1), (g)(2) (1988).
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1), (b), (c) (1988).
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(d) (1988).
108. These waivers were modified in the 1990 Immigration law as discussed infra.
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quirements, if she could satisfy the criteria for an extreme hardship
waiver or a good faith, good cause waiver. 109
The Attorney General had the discretion to remove the conditional
basis of the alien spouse's status if the alien spouse could demon-
strate that extreme hardship would result if she were deported. In
determining whether there was extreme hardship, the Attorney Gen-
eral could consider only those circumstances which occurred during
the period that the alien spouse was admitted for permanent resi-
dence on a conditional basis. 110 The Attorney General could also re-
move the conditional basis of an alien spouse's immigration status if
the alien spouse could demonstrate that she entered into the mar-
riage in good faith, the marriage had been terminated by her for
good cause, and she was not at fault in failing to meet the statute's
petition and interview requirements.""
However, an alien spouse who demonstrated the facts that would
constitute extreme hardship or good faith and good cause was not
guaranteed a waiver. The statute gave the Attorney General discre-
tion to grant or deny either of these waivers." 2 Even if the alien
spouse met the criteria for one or both of the waivers, a waiver could
still be denied by the Attorney General." 3
The INS, the Attorney General's designee for the application of
the statute, promulgated regulations interpreting the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments." 4 The administrative interpretations
of the statute's waiver provisions limited their use in mitigating the
Marriage Fraud Act's coverture-like harms to alien spouses, even
those abused by their United States spouses.
The INS regulations regarding the extreme hardship waiver stated
that any deportation from the United States is likely to result in a
certain degree of hardship and that a waiver would be granted only
when the alien meets the burden of demonstrating that extreme
hardship existed." 5 In response to comments on the proposed regula-
tiong, the INS refused to clarify the term "extreme hardship." The
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(1988).
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) (1988).
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (1988).
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (1988).
113. The Supreme Court has held that when the Attorney General has discretion
to grant or deny a particular petition, meeting the criteria does not entitle a petitioner to
the relief requested. See, e.g., INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446 (1985); INS v.
Abudu 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988).
114. 53 Fed. Reg., 30011-23, August 10, 1988; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1, 204, 205, 211-12,
214, 216, 223, 223a, 235, 242, 245 (1990).
115. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(1) (1990).
INS stated only that the words were used in accordance with their
everyday meaning." 6
An indication of restrictive interpretation of the extreme hardship
waiver provision was expressed in an INS official's opinion. She
stated that for the waiver to be granted the alien must establish that
the extreme hardship would ensue as a result of the alien's deporta-
tion.117 Therefore, in her opinion, the extreme hardship waiver would
be unlikely in a situation in which the alien was a battered spouse,
because "the hardship has already been suffered while in the United
States, and it would not be likely to be aggravated by departure
from this country.""'
This approach ignored the extreme hardship inherent in a bat-
tering situation. If deported, a battered alien spouse could not pursue
criminal or divorce proceedings against her abuser. She could not
continue the health care and counseling needed to recover from the
abuse. Deporting her would force her to go to a place where she may
not have legal or physical protection from the battering spouse or be
stigmatized because of having been battered." 9 Deportation of a
battered spouse would heap additional extreme trauma on a person
who has been subjected to the harrowing experience of violence in
her own family at the hands of an individual from whom she ex-
pected love and affection.
The opinion that the extreme hardship waiver did not apply to
situations of spouse abuse also ignored clear Congressional intent.
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report discussed the extreme
hardship waiver and indicated that the Committee intended this pro-
vision to be interpreted liberally in situations in which a marriage
broke down for legitimate causes. 120 The report gave specific exam-
ples of situations in which the Committee expected the waiver would
be granted and these included a situation in which the alien spouse
was abused by a citizen or resident spouse.
121
The INS interpretation of the good faith, good cause waiver was
also restrictive and gave unnecessary and arbitrary control over the
legality of the alien spouse's immigration status to the citizen or resi-
dent spouse. 22 The INS rejected the assertion that the statute al-
116. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,015 (Aug. 10, 1988).
117. Letter from Bonnie Derwinski, Acting INS Director for Congressional and
Public Affairs, Oct. 19, 1989, reproduced in 66 Interpreter Releases 1428-29, App. III
(Dec. 18, 1989) [hereinafter Derwinski's Letter].
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Martinez Mendoza v. INS, 567 F.2d 1222, 1223-24 (3d Cir. 1977).
120. S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong, 2d Sess. 8 (1986).
121. Id.
122. The preliminary statistics regarding this category showed that as of October
1989, the INS had received 3,625 good faith/good cause waivers. Of these, 1452 had
been granted, 510 were denied and 1663 were still pending. Derwinski's letter, supra
note 117.
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lowed the filing of a good faith, good cause waiver when the citizen
or resident spouse initiated divorce proceedings. The Service took the
position that the alien spouse was not eligible for the waiver unless
she initiated the divorce or annulment proceedings, even if she lived
in a state with no fault divorce laws or even if the United States
spouse was ultimately found to be at fault.123
Further, the INS insisted on independent judgment of the issue of
whether the alien spouse terminated the marriage for good cause.124
The regulations stated that the finding of a court that the citizen or
resident spouse was at fault was not conclusive evidence that the
alien spouse terminated the marriage for good cause. 25
The INS interpretation of the good faith, good cause waiver did
not even afford a realistic alternative for abused women. Under the
INS's interpretation, to be eligible for the good faith, good cause
waiver, an abused spouse had to initiate and obtain a judicial termi-
nation of her marriage. 2 6 For a battered woman, such a requirement
was often very difficult and dangerous. It required her to leave an
abusive situation, find a lawyer, and race her spouse to the court-
house. Further, the requirement of a judicial proceeding can put an
abused spouse in extreme danger. It brings her into contact and
physical proximity with the person she is trying to escape. The initia-
tion of divorce proceedings could infuriate a batterer and lead to in-
creases in the frequency and intensity of the battering. In fact, the
time period in which a battered spouse is trying to formally termi-
nate the relationship is one of the most dangerous for her. 2 7 Thus,
the INS's restrictive and erroneous interpretation of the Mariage
Fraud Amendment's waiver provisions provided very little respite
from the coverture-based control imposed by this law.
123. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,014 (Aug. 10, 1988); see also INS Central Office Responses
to Questions About the Marriage Fraud Act, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 337-41, ques-
tions 27, 47, 53, 54 (1990).
124. 8 C.F.R. 216.5 (e)(2)(iii) (1990); 53 Fed. Reg. 30,014 (Aug. 10, 1988).
125. 8 C.F.R. 216.5 (e)(2)(iii) (1990).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(d) (1988).
127. OKUN & LEWIS, WOMAN ABUSE FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 56 (1986) (not-
ing the higher incidence of abuse among divorcing couples).
D. The 1990 Immigration Act: Coverture-Based Principle of
Spouse Domination Remains But With Some
Amelioration of 1986 Increases
While the Immigration Act of 1990128 substantially revised the le-
gal immigration system,'129 it basically maintained family-based im-
migration and the role of spouse-based immigration in that system.
Under the 1990 law, immediate relatives, including the spouses of
U.S. citizens, may become permanent residents without regard to
numerical quotas.130 The spouses of permanent residents are part of
a group which receives preference in the distribution of world-wide
numerical quotas.13' Furthermore, under the 1990 act a substantial
portion of the visas in this category are not subject to per country
limitations., 32
While spouse-based immigration is thus favored, the 1990 law
continued the coverture-based control first incorporated into the
1917 and 1924 acts. Under the 1990 law, an alien spouse still can
become a legal resident only if her citizen or permanent resident
spouse files a petition for her to become a resident. 133 The citizen or
resident spouse can still withdraw the petition at will and is the only
one who can appeal a denial of the petition. 34 The basic conditional
resident system for spouses established in 1986 continues. An alien
spouse's residence is conditional for two years. She generally must
have the c6operation of her citizen or resident spouse to continue in
a legal status after that time.135
However, in 1990 Congress modified the good faith waiver and
created an additional waiver based on the abuse of the conditional
resident or her child by the citizen or resident spouse.' 38 Thus, cur-
rently there are three waivers to the joint petition requirehient to
prevent the termination of a conditional resident's legal status. First,
the conditional resident continues to have the option to show that her
deportation would result in extreme hardship. Second, a conditional
resident can show that she entered into the marriage in good faith,
but that the marriage has been terminated. She no longer needs to
128. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C.).
129. The law expanded employment based immigration and added a category des-
ignated "diversity" to allow the immigration of aliens from recently low admission coun-
tries. Among other changes, it modified grounds for exclusion and deportation.
ALEINKOFF & MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 61 (1991).
130. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1991).
131. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
132. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1152(a)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
133. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a) (West Supp. 1991).
134. 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(a)(4), 205.1(a)(1) (1991).
135. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a (West Supp. 1991).
136. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), (C) (West Supp. 1991).
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demonstrate that she terminated the marriage for good cause. Third,
the conditional resident can show that she entered into the marriage
in good faith, but she or her child was subject to battering or ex-
treme cruelty by the citizen or resident spouse.1, 7 All three waivers
are subject to the exercise of the Attorney General's discretion; i.e.,
the alien may qualify for the waiver and still be denied. 8
These statutory waivers, while an improvement over the 1986 pro-
visions, are still limited and do not totally remove spousal domina-
tion. Furthermore, the INS has issued interim regulations which
continue a restrictive administrative approach to the statutory waiv-
ers that prevent automatic termination of the alien spouse's legal sta-
tus. The details of these restrictions and how they should be changed
are discussed in Section V.
IV. IMPACT OF SPOUSE-BASED IMMIGRATION LAWS
Thus, the immigration law still perpetuates a citizen or resident
spouse's domination over his alien spouse. The citizen or resident
spouse can choose whether or not to initiate his alien spouse's legal
residence. If the citizen or resident spouse does not initiate the alien
spouse's legal residence, she does not have the right to work in the
United States and faces deportation. If she has citizen children, she
also loses her ability to live with them in the United States. A citizen
or resident spouse still has basic control over the termination of his
alien spouse's legal residence once obtained. This control is .the norm
under the law. It is only somewhat limited by the availability of
some waivers that are subject to INS discretion.
This kind of spousal control is analogous to the power over mar-
ried women's livelihood, home, and children imposed by coverture.
In the initial petition process, it also raises problems similar to cover-
ture in situations of spouse abuse. The law gives so much power to
the citizen or resident spouse that the alien spouse is faced with a
Hobson's choice: either remain in an abusive relationship, or leave
and confront deprivation of home, livelihood, and ability to promote
a child's best interests.
Alien spouses of both sexes are theoretically subject to the law's
spousal domination. However, the law'has the greatest adverse im-
pact on women immigrants. This is true for three reasons. First, the
immigrants gaining status as spouses have been predominantly fe-
137. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
138. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
male.139 Second, wives have legally and socially been the historical
target of subordination in marriage.1 40 Third, spouse abuse in the
United States is pervasive and the majority of victims of spouse
abuse are women.'4 Furthermore, because women are most fre-
quently the primary caretakers of children, and wife abuse is associ-
ated with child abuse, the spouse-based immigration laws harm both
the alien and citizen children of alien spouses. 42
A. The Predominance of Female Spouse-Based Immigration
The prevailing view of immigrants is that the vast majority are
young males. 4 ' Yet the reality is different. Women have in the past,
and will in the future, comprise a substantial proportion of the immi-
grant population. Since 1930, overall migration into the United
States has been predominantly female.144 Even prior to 1930, when
migration was predominately male, females made up a substantial
proportion of immigrants . 45 The predominance of female migration
to the United States has been pronounced in categories of spouse-
based immigration, i.e., immigration based on marriage to a United
States citizen or legal permanent resident.1
46
Since 1930, overall migration into the United States has been
predominated by females. 47  Furthermore, women have
predominated as immigrants into the United States from most re-
gions and countries of the world. 48 In each year from 1930 to 1979,
139. See Section A infra.
140. See discussion of coverture, supra Section II. Kurz, Social Science Perspec-
tives on Wife Abuse: Current Debates and Future Directions, 3 GENDER & SOCIETY
495-96 (1989) and Section B infra.
141. See Section B infra.
142. See Section C infra.
143. Houstoun, Kramer & Barrett, Female Predominance of Immigration to the
United States Since 1930: A First Look, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 908, 909 (1984)
[hereinafter Houstoun]; Donato & Tyree, Family Reunification, Health Professionals,
and the Sex Composition of Immigrants to the United States, 70 Soc. & Soc. REs. 226,
226 (1986) [hereinafter Donato].
144. Houstoun, supra note 143, at 913.
145. The percentage of female migration into the United States before 1930
ranged from a low of 30.4% in the decade from 1900-1909 to a high of 43.8% in the
decade from 1920-1929. Houstoun, supra note 143, at 910, 951, 960, 961. This analysis
is based on tabulations of immigrant flows by sex which were available only after 1856.
Donato, supra note 143, at 226.
146. Houstoun, supra note 143, at 922.
147. Decades from 1930-1979 had the following percentages of female immi-
grants: from 1930-39, 55.3 % of immigrants were female; 1940-49, 61.2% female; 1950-
59, 53.7% female; 1960-69, 55.6% female; 1970-79, 53% female. Id. at 913.
148. For example, a study of immigration for the years between 1975 and 1980
found that women outnumbered men from countries in the Western Hemisphere except
from Mexico, whose immigrants to the United States were 48 % female. Women
predominated in most European immigration into the United States. Most immigration
from Asian countries with large numbers of immigrants had a higher percentage of
women. For example, China, Japan, Korea, Phillippines, Taiwan, and Thailand sent
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the percentage of females immigrating was higher than-the percent-
age of males.1 49 Beginning in 1982, there was a shift to a slight male
majority until 1986 and 1987, when there were slightly more female
immigrants. 50 Government projections indicate that future migra-
tion will include slightly more females than males. 151
Studies have demonstrated the particular predominance of women
in spouse-based immigration'52 into the United States. 3 For exam-
ple, for the time period from 1972 to 1979, sixty-two percent of
spouses of United States citizens entering the United States as immi-
grants were women. In that same time period, almost two-thirds of
the spouses of permanent residents entering as immigrants were
women. T' A study by the General Accounting Office found that in
1985, native-born citizens petitioning for spouses were predomi-
nantly male.
55
The fact that women predominate in spouse-based immigration
has been discounted in the enactment of immigration legislation.
Thus any focus on the impact that the law has on immigrant women
has been suppressed. In the 1951 Senate Judiciary Committee Re-
port leading to the passage of the 1952 Immigration Act, the Com-
more women while Vietnam and India sent more men. Males dominated the smaller
immigration flows from Africa and countries in the Middle East. Donato & Tyree, Un-
derstanding the Sex Composition of Immigrants to the U.S. 1, 23-24 (1986) (Paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association in New York,
Aug., 1986. Available from the Dept. of Sociology at SUNY Stony Brook) [hereinafter
Donato & Tyree].
149. Houstoun, supra note 143, at 962-63.
150. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS BRANCH, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SER-
VICE, THE PRESIDENT'S COMPREHENSIVE TRIENNIAL REPORT ON IMMIGRATION 12
(1989); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1988
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 24 (1989).
151. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION: THE FUTURE FLOW OF
LEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. 32, 33 (1988) (Report to the Chairman, Subcommit-
tee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate)
[hereinafter G.A.O.].
152. The spouses of United States citizens comprise most of the spouse-based im-
migration. Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements, supra note 95, at 21. For
example, from 1972-1979, 408,691 aliens immigrated to the United States as the spouses
of United States citizens, while 187,456 aliens immigrated to the United States as the
spouses of permanent resident aliens. Houstoun, supra note 143, at 924, 925.
153. Donato, supra note 143, at 226; Donato & Tyree, supra note 148, at 2.
154. Houstoun, supra note 143, at 925.
155. The study found that most United States citizen petitioners for immediate
relative immigrants were native-born citizens rather than naturalized citizens, and that
these native-born petitioners most frequently petitioned for spouses. In the 1985 G.A.O.
study, there was some indication that female citizens in increasing numbers are seeking
the immigration of male spouses. The General Accounting Office reported an increase in
the male spouse based immigration in 1982-84. G.A.O., supra note 151, at 33.
mittee asserted that "a preponderance of male immigrants is one of
the principal characteristics of international or long distance migra-
tion. 156 Yet the facts before the Committee supported a different
conclusion. 57 The report noted, but then discounted, the predomi-
nance of female immigration into the United States since the 1930's,
particularly in the area of spouse-based immigration. 158 The commit-
tee concluded that "the present preponderance of female immigra-
tion will not continue." 159 Despite the 1951 judiciary committee's
predictions, migration into the United States, and particularly
spouse-based immigration, remained predominantly female.16 0 Yet
the heavy female composition of spouse-based immigration was not
mentioned or considered by the executive or legislative policy makers
in post-1952 changes in the immigration laws, even when the topic of
reform was family renunification or marriage-based immigration.
In hearings leading up to the Marriage Fraud Act, the informa-
tion presented to the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Ref-
ugee Policy by the Commissioner of the INS consisted of statistics
on immigration to the United States based on marital relationships
in general, with no indication of the sex composition of this popula-
tion. 6' Furthermore, the United States citizens testifying before the
subcommittee that they had been the subject of fraudulent mar-
riages with aliens were women, giving the impression that aliens im-
migrating as spouses were male.1
62
The fact that spouse-based immigration has been substantially
and, for many years, predominantly female needs to be acknowl-
edged and taken into account in the formulation of immigration law
and policy. The failure to do so contributes to the perpetuation of the
premises of coverture in the immigration laws.
B. The Historical and Social Domination of Wives by Husbands
and the Pervasiveness of Wife Abuse
As discussed previously, the doctrine of coverture and its compo-
nent, the right of chastisement, established a legal basis for the sub-
ordination of women and their total domination by their husbands.
6 3
It has taken a number of years for legal institutions to confront and
156. S. REP. No. 1515, supra note 76, at 160.
157. The report noted that in the decade from 1931-1940, females comprised
56.6% of immigrants and, in the decade from 1941-1950, females comprised 59% of
immigrants, thus demonstrating a preponderance of female immigration since 1930. Id.
at 160.
158. Id. at 160-61.
159. Id. at 161.
160. See Houstoun, supra note 143; G.A.O., supra note 151.
161. Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements, supra note 95, at 21.
162. Id. at 42-56.
163. See Sections II A and B supra.
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reject the underlying premises of these doctrines, and the process is
not complete. 6 4 Furthermore, even though the law has changed dra-
matically since the beginning of the twentieth century, social norms
of spouse domination and control persist. Control of wives by hus-
bands still is seen by many as the husband's right. This is accompa-
nied by the social acceptance of violence as a means of control.16 5
The "king of his castle" analogy persists. The "king" has absolute
power and the expectation of control and obedience. If his expecta-
tion is not met, he has the right to use force to maintain control.
These lingering cultural norms set the stage for and influence the
extent of wife battering.16 6 While social scientists have different per-
spectives about the causes of wife abuse, 67 there is agreement that
the power of men over women and the perception of the husband's
right to dominate are major fundamental factors in the high level of
wife abuse in our society.
16 8
Wife abuse is a serious social problem in the United States. 69 In-
ter-spousal violence occurs in all socio-economic levels. 17  National
Surveys suggest that twenty to twenty-five percent of adult women in
the United States have been physically assaulted by an adult inti-
mate: between twelve and fifteen million women.'' Conjugal as-
saults comprise five to eleven percent of reported assaults in the
United States, and studies show that conjugal assaults are under-
reported to the police. 72 Conjugal assaults tend to have more serious
consequences than other assaults. 7 3 For example, the National
Crime Survey found that while only five percent of all assaults were
conjugal assaults, they accounted for twelve percent of assaults end-
164. See Section II C supra.
165. Kurz, supra note 140, at 496-97.
166. L. OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE, FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 69, 90-91 (1986).
167. Kurz, supra note 140, at 489-90; DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 46 (D. Sonkin ed. 1986).
168. Kurz, supra note 140, at 493, 495-97.
169. L. OKUN, supra note 166, at 35-39; A. BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN
KILL 4 (1987); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note
42, at 2; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. 4796, 4810-12
(U.S. June 29, 1992); Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Vio-
lence Against Women: Relevance for Medical Practitioners, 267 J. AM. MED. A. 3184,
3185-87 (1992) [hereinafter Council on Scientific Affairs].
170. L. OKUN, supra note 166, at 45.
171. House Report 101-737, Sept. 21, 1990 accompanying House Congressional
Resolution 172. See also M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED
DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 36, 40, 50 (1980); R. GELLES & M.
STRAUSS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 104, 250 (1988).
172. L. OKUN, supra note 166, at 35.
173. Id. at 35-36.
ing in serious injury and sixteen percent of those requiring medical
care. 17 4 Moreover, eight to eighteen percent of murder victims in the
United States were killed by their spouses.15
Most studies show that men are much more likely than women to
engage in serious spousal assaults.176 For example, the National
Crime Survey found a rate of thirteen assaulted wives for every as-
saulted husband. 7 7 One study found that almost thirty-seven percent
of wives seeking divorce alleged physical abuse by their husbands. 178
Even when both spouses participated in inter-spousal violence,
ninety-five percent of the time, the woman, rather than the man gets
injured.7 Most battered women experience multiple assaults180 and
the extent of violence and injury tends to increase over time.' 81 Preg-
nancy tends to increase the frequency of wife abuse.'8 2 Thirty to
forty percent of female murder victims in the United States were the
wives of their murderers. 83
Since wife abuse is so pervasive in the United States, it is not
surprising that alien wives are abused by their citizen and resident
husbands, as the individual situations in the introduction illustrate.
Surveys of alien women have also found that they suffer substantial
abuse. For example, a survey of alien women in San Francisco found
that twenty-four percent of the Latina and twenty percent of the
Filipina study participants had experienced domestic violence, and
that for forty-two percent of the Latinas and twenty percent of the
Filipinas their dependence on their husbands for legal status was a
major problem. 84 Another survey reported sixty percent of the sur-
veyed Korean immigrant women had been abused by their
spouses.'8 5
174. Id. at 36.
175. Id.; Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4811.
176. The Gelles and Straus surveys have been criticized for not distinguishing
among different kinds and degrees of violence. Kurz, supra note 140, at 494-95. How-
ever, even these surveys recognized the dominance of male violence in serious spouse
abuse. While these surveys found that women and men engage in violence in about the
same numbers, they also found that many of the assaults by women against husbands are
in self-defense and that the violence by men is more injurious. M. STRAUS, R. GELLES &
S. STEINMETZ, supra note 171, at 43; R. GELLES & M. STRAUS, supra note 171, at 90.
177. L. OKUN, supra note 166, at 39.
178. Id. at 37.
179. A. BROWNE, supra note 169, at 8.
180. L. OKUN, supra note 166, at 49.
181. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 25-26 (1984).
182. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4810-11; Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note
169, at 3187; L. OKUN, supra note 166, at 51.
183. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4811; L. OKUN, supra note 166, at 36.
184. C. HOGELAND & R. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 15.
185. Ramirez, Violence at Home Grips Alien Women, San Francisco Examiner,
Mar. 10, 1991 at A20, col. 1; see also Lin, Is INS Hindering Abused Wives?, Newsday
(New York), July 8, 1991 at 21 col. 2, reporting on the large percentage of battered
immigrant women with citizen or resident spouses serviced by the Asian Women's Shel-
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Furthermore, the social situation of many immigrant women
makes them particularly vulnerable to an abusive spouse. Wife abus-
ers are usually extremely controlling. They try to dominate their
wives and make them completely dependent. Abusers seek to remove
any sense of their wives' autonomy. They try to isolate them socially
and deprive their wives of money and resources."8 6 A recent immi-
grant is frequently very socially dependent on her citizen or resident
spouse. Often, she has left behind the family and friends that could
provide her other support. She is unlikely to be familiar with the
culture, the legal system, her legal rights, social service agencies, or
medical care services.1
8 7
In addition to the horror of domestic violence, these alien spouses
must confront an immigration law that blocks their escape from
abuse. The current immigration law gives the citizen or resident
spouse the legal ability to control and isolate his alien spouse. He
controls her alien status and therefore her ability to live and work in
the United States. His control over her status is also his control over
her alien children's status and may impact her ability to maintain
the custody of citizen children. Concern about child custody is a
common factor in preventing women from leaving a battering
situation. 88
The law itself can thus be a contributing factor to spouse abuse.
The battering spouse's propensity toward violence and domination
are exacerbated by the extensive power of a law which gives him
total control over his spouse's immigration status. The abused alien
spouse's perception of entrapment and hopelessness caused by the
abuse is made concrete by the reality of a law which makes her to-
tally dependent upon her spouse and gives the spouse the legal
means to enforce his domination.
The impact of the battering of alien women by their spouses ex-
tends beyond the extensive harm to the abused women. Battering
behavior takes a toll on society. Police and social services are needed
to deal with the immediate consequences of battering. 8 9 Studies
have shown the great impact of wife abuse in the provision of medi-
cal services. One conservative study with low estimates of assaults
still presented a sobering analysis of the annual morbidity associated
ter in New York City.
186. L. OKUN, supra note 166, at 68.
187. See J. Lur, Battered Asian Women, RICE 50 (March 1988).
188. A. BROWNE, supra note 169, at 111.
189. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 12, 17.
with domestic violence: 21,000 hospitalizations, 99,800 days of hos-
pitalization, 28,700 emergency department visits, 39,900 visits to
physicians, and a total direct health care cost of $44,393,700.19 A
more recent study which used a protocol to identify injuries caused
by abuse found that thirty percent of the trauma patients treated in
an emergency room were battered women. 191 Battering behavior now
also results in future societal harm. Witnessing violence is a factor in
the inter-generational transmission of violence.192 Furthermore, the
battering of women has an impact on those in the society who are
not battered by reinforcing the message that this subordination of
women is the cultural norm.
9 3
The impact of the spousal domination inherent in the immigration
law on abused alien spouses must be confronted by legislative and
administrative policy makers. The law should not give a United
States spouse the power to entrap his spouse in an abusive relation-
ship with the threat of illegal immigration status.
C. The Harm to Citizen and Alien Children
The spouse-based immigration laws harm both citizen and alien
children. One of the premises of coverture was that a married wo-
man's children belonged to her husband. She had no power to pro-
tect them or to provide for their best interests. She had to watch
helplessly as her husband controlled the children's living arrange-
ments, education, and discipline. The legacies of this premise are
contained in the current immigration law. By controlling an alien
spouse's immigration status, a citizen or resident spouse controls her
ability to live with and support her children in the United States. An
alien spouse's children may lose their legal immigration status if she
loses her status.' A citizen child could lose the ability to live with
her primary caretaker or be subject to de facto deportation.
The relationship of an alien parent to a minor United States citi-
zen child forms no basis for the parent's immigration status.195 Fur-
190. McLeer & Anwar, A Study of Battered Women Presenting in an Emergency
Department, 79 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 65 (1989) (reporting results of
the National Crime Survey).
191. Id. at 66.
192. Walker & Edwall, Domestic Violence and Determination of Visitation and
Custody in Divorce, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 151 (D. Sonkin ed. 1986).
193. Cf. Breines & Gordon, The New Scholarship on Family Violence, SIGNS 515
(Spring 1983); Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMENS' L.J.
83 (1980).
194. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
195. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1988). See Piatt, Born As Second Class Citizens in the
U.S.A.: Children of Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 35 (1988) (discus-
sion of the plight of the citizen children of undocumented parents imposed by current
immigration policies and the courts' unwillingness to protect these children).
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thermore, courts have held that a United States citizen child's con-
stitutional rights are not violated when the child's parent is deported
from the United States, even when that parent is the child's care-
taker and support, or when the deportation of the parent would force
the de facto deportation of the citizen child. 196 An alien mother
forced to be in an illegal status by the control of her citizen or resi-
dent spouse is subject to deportation. She would then have to con-
front either abandoning her citizen child in the United States, or, if
she can gain custody, taking the child to live in a place where the
child's education, economic opportunity, or even physical safety may
be severely limited.
If there is a custody dispute, the alien parent who has been forced
into illegality by the non-cooperation of her citizen or alien spouse is
at a severe disadvantage, even if she is the child's primary caretaker
and the child's best interests are in jeopardy. A court deciding child
custody is forced to choose between two alternatives, both of which
may be disastrous for the child. Custody could be awarded to the
alien parent who could be forced to take the citizen child from the
United States, perhaps to a war-torn or economically-deprived coun-
try, or custody could be denied to the alien parent, thereby depriving
the child of primary emotional support.
The situation is particularly alarming when a United States citi-
zen or resident abuses his spouse or child. Children suffer from the
abuse of their mothers by their fathers. Children who see their fa-
thers beat their mothers suffer serious emotional trauma. 197 A num-
ber of children are beaten by wife-battering fathers in connection
with the beating of their mothers or separately. 198 One study found
that seventy percent of men who assaulted their wives also physically
abused their children.'99
An alien mother who has been beaten herself, or whose husband
196. Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3rd Cir. 1977); Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d
1179 (5th Cir. 1969); Marquez-Medina v. INS, 765 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1985).
197. D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 23 (1981); see also NATIONAL CENTER ON
WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, CUSTODY LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF BATTERED WOMEN,
1988 Supplement 13-18 (overview of the psychological research on the effects of domes-
tic violence on children).
198. M. PAGELOW, CHILDREN IN VIOLENT FAMILIES: DIRECT AND INDIRECT VIC-
TIMS (1981); S. HILL & B.J. BARNES, YOUNG CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (1982); L.
WALKER. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) (especially Chapter 6, Impact of
Violence in the Home on Children).
199. Kurz, supra note 140, at 499 (citing Bowker, Arbitell and McFerron, On the
Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON WIFE
ABUSE 158-74 (Yllo & Bograd ed. 1988)).
abuses their child, is limited in her ability to protect her child by her
spouse's control over her immigration status. If the alien spouse
never obtains or loses her legal immigration status, she cannot work
and provide for her child. She is also subject to deportation with the
consequence that the child will be left with an abusive parent, be-
come a ward of the state, or be forced to leave the United States.
V. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINSITRATIVE CHANGES NEEDED TO
MITIGATE THE LEGACIES OF COVERTURE
Changes in legislation and administrative interpretation are
needed to remove the legacies of coverture from the immigration
law.200 The current immigration law perpetuates the premises of cov-
erture and chastisement in two ways. First, the law affords citizen or
resident spouses total control over whether their alien spouses ever
gain resident status. Second, with some limited exceptions, the con-
ditional resident scheme gives the citizen or resident spouse control
over the continuation of the alien spouse's legal status. Removal of
spousal control from the immigration laws would require change in
two aspects of the law: the initial process through which a spouse
gains resident status and the conditional resident scheme.
In other areas, laws which established the control of husband over
wife and gave legitimacy to battering have been renounced. 201 The
spousal domination in the immigration laws should be similarly re-
jected. This would be in keeping with the provision of the immigra-
tion law that prohibits sex discrimination in the issuance of immi-
grant visas202 and would finally meet the Congressional objective of
sexual equality in the immigration laws.20 3
Some may argue that since both male and female immigrant
spouses have been subject to spousal control, the law is sex neutral.
However, in reality, the law perpetuates discrimination against
200. This article attempts to demonstrate the errors of legislative judgment about
spouse-based immigration and suggest legislative and administrative changes. It is not
focused on constructing a theory that would support a court determination of the uncon-
stitutionality of the spouse-based immigration laws on the ground that they are sex dis-
criminatory. However, the theoretical approach in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey parallels the approach to legislation
and administrative rule making suggested here. In Casey, the Court assessed the consti-
tutional validity of a statute requiring spousal notification before a woman could have an
abortion. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the court rejected the notions of cover-
ture and took the factual realities of spousal abuse into account. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. at
4810-13. This article does not address reforms outside of the current spouse-based sys-
tem. See, e.g., Comment, Alienating Sham Marriages for Tougher Immigration Penal-
ties: Congress Enacts the Marriage Fraud Act, 15 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 181, 203 (1988)
(suggestion that immigration benefits should be extended to relationships based on affin-
ity such as couples who live together, but are not married, and same sex couples).
201. See supra Section II C.
202. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1988).
203. See supra notes 78 and 90 and accompanying text.
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women. Factually, the majority of alien spouses are women. Socially,
in good part because of laws that made inequality and subordination
of wives the cultural norm, it is generally husbands, not wives, who
subject their spouses to domination and abuse. Gender equality can-
not be achieved with a law that purports to be neutral but in reality
perpetuates the premises of past gender discrimination and dispro-
portionately impacts on women. Sexual equality can be achieved
when the law confronts and rejects the premises of its historical sex
discrimination and gives women the ability to live equally with men
in a society that still has remnants of that discrimination. Sexual
equality is not freedom to be treated without regard to sex. It is
freedom from subordination because of gender.20 4
Congressional response to the harm to women perpetuated by the
immigration law need not be gender specific, i.e., give benefits to
women over men. But the legislature must take into account the ba-
sis for and the impact of the immigration law's historical sex dis-
crimination. Instead of allowing both men and women to be subject
to spouse control, the law should reject the notion of spousal
domination.
A. Changes Needed to the Initial Process Through Which a
Spouse Becomes a Permanent Resident
The current initial process through which an alien spouse becomes
a permanent residence involves coverture-like spousal control. Only
the citizen or resident spouse can file the initial petition that would
entitle the alien spouse to legal status.20 5 The citizen or resident
spouse can withdraw this petition and is the only person allowed to
appeal its denial. 206 This is true despite the continuing validity of the
marriage, the good faith of the alien spouse, or even the existence
and well being of citizen children of the marriage.
Proposals to change this process by eliminating spousal control are
likely to draw two main objections. The first is the concern about
fraud. The Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 were passed be-
cause Congress and the INS were convinced that marriage fraud to
204. Scales, The Emergence of a Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L. J.
1373, 1395 (1986); see also Schneider, supra note 31, at 629, 645, stating that equality
requires social reconstruction of gender roles and freedom from sexual subordination and
violence.
205. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a) (Supp. 1991).
206. 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(a)(4), 205.1(a)(1) (1991).
achieve immigration status was rampant. °7 Subsequent analysis of
the data that purportedly supported such a conclusion shows serious
flaws with the data.20 8 Yet, concern about fraud persists. 209 A second
objection would be based on the contention that since the purpose of
the spouse-based immigration laws is family unification for citizens
and residents, the right to choose to be unified or not unified with a
spouse belongs to the citizen or resident.210
The response to these contentions is that concerns about fraud and
the choices of citizens or residents have been and must be balanced
with other important social objectives. The immigration law already
contains provisions that overcome concerns about fraud. These provi-
sions limit a United States citizen's ability to choose which relatives
will become permanent residents and allow certain relatives to self-
petition. These provisions demonstrate an acknowledgement that
there can be social policy reasons for allowing an alien to self-peti-
tion when her United States relative does not petition for her to be-
come a permanent resident.
There is precedence in the immigration laws for allowing an alien,
in a familial relationship with a United States citizen who does not
petition for her, to petition for herself. The surviving alien spouses of
United States citizens are allowed to self-petition for immigrant sta-
tus when, during their lifetimes, their United States citizen spouses
had not chosen to petition for them.211 Also, certain children of
United States citizens are allowed to self-petition when the citizen
parent chooses not to. An alien who was fathered by a United States
citizen and born in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, or Thailand
after 1950 and before October 1982 can file a petition on his or her
own to be classified as an immediate relative or preference immi-
grant entitled to live in the United States as a legal permanent resi-
207. Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements, supra note 95.
208. INS Reveals Basis for Fraud Claims, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 26-27
(1988).
209. The fraud Congress focused on, however, was of two kinds: fraud by an alien
who deceives a citizen or resident into marriage solely to achieve immigration status, and
collusive fraud in which an alien and a citizen or resident agree (sometimes for money)
to enter a marriage solely so that the alien can achieve immigrant status. Congress did
not look at situations in which the alien married a citizen or resident in good faith in-
tending to establish a loving, long term relationship, only to discover she had been lured
into an abusive relationship. Immigration Marriage Fraud Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1985) (Statement of INS Commissioner Alan Nelson).
210. Senator Alan K. Simpson has been quoted as saying, "The basis [for the cur-
rent law] is to assist the American citizen" and also, "the original intent was not to help
the alien but the American citizen." Wall St. J., August 28, 1989, at A10, col. 1.
211. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l51(b)(2)(A)(iy (West Supp. 1991). The widow or widower
must have been married to the citizen for at least two years, must not have been legally
separated from the citizen at the time of the citizen's death, and must file the petition
within two years of the citizen's death. The petition cannot be filed after the surviving
alien spouse remarries.
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dent.212 Vietnamese children fathered by United States citizens and
born between 1962 and 1976 were given a special two year opportu-
nity to immigrate to the United States. In addition to gaining per-
manent resident status for themselves, they were allowed to be ac-
companied by their spouses, children, and mothers or persons who
had acted as their principal parents. 13
These laws were passed because of Congressional realization of
the hardship imposed on children and spouses by uncaring United
States relatives. 14 They provide an opportunity for legal immigrant
status for aliens whose United States relatives had abandoned their
familial responsibilities and did not cooperate in establishing a status
for their relatives. These provisions overrode the concern for a
United States citizen's choice of which relatives should immigrate
with humanitarian concerns for the children and spouses the citizens
ignored or abandoned.
Changes in the initial process through which a spouse becomes a
permanent resident are supported by similar humanitarian concerns
and strong social policy objectives. The legislature must rid the law
of the discriminatory outmoded notion of spouse domination. Partic-
ularly, in the face of serious social problems like spouse abuse and
child abuse and abandonment, the law should not enforce power re-
lationships that promote behavior destructive to individuals and
society.
A simple solution to the removal of spouse domination in the ini-
tial process would be to allow the alien spouse to petition for her own
immigrant status upon proof of a good faith marriage to a citizen or
resident. This proposal, however, may be unrealistic in light of the
legislative and administrative concerns about marriage fraud ex-
pressed in the 1986 Marriage Fraud Act. The following, therefore,
proposes that spousal control be removed in certain circumstances
where the humanitarian need is high and the potential for fraud low.
Certain alien spouses and children of citizens or residents should
be able to initiate a process to gain resident status without the per-
mission of their United States spouses or parents. Alien spouses who
are living in the United States and can demonstrate that they en-
212. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(0 (West Supp. 1991).
213. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 202, § 10le, 101 Stat. 1329-183 (1987).
214. See Mermelstein, Welcoming Home Our Children: An Analysis of the New
Amerasian Immigration Law, 2 B. U. INT'L L. J. 299 (1983); DeMonaco, Disorderly
Departure: An Analysis of the United Slates Policy Toward Amerasian Immigration, 15
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 641 (1989).
tered into their marriages in good faith should be able to petition for
legal status on their own in three circumstances. The first is when an
alien spouse or her child is abused by her citizen or resident spouse.
The second is when the alien spouse has had a United States citizen
child with her citizen or resident spouse and the alien spouse lives
with and cares for her citizen child. The third is when the alien can
demonstrate that she would suffer substantial hardship caused by
lack of legal status. Additionally, an alien child living in the United
States Who has be6n abused or abandoned by her citizen or resident
parent should have the ability to apply for legal status without that
abusive parent's participation.
Providing access to legal status for these groups would address im-
portant general social policy concerns that would override particular
concerns about detection of fraud or citizen or resident choice. An
abused alien spouse or child should not suffer the additional harms
of illegal status or deportation. The legislature needs to make it clear
to abusive citizens and residents that they cannot perpetuate their
abuse by using the immigration law to threaten alien spouses with
inability to work, deportation, and loss of child custody. Similarly, a
United States citizen child of a citizen or resident parent living with
and cared for by her alien parent should not be harmed by being
deprived of living in the country of her citizenship with a caretaker
parent. This is particularly important when the citizen or resident
parent has abused, abandoned, or abdicated responsibility for his
child. Furthermore, a provision that takes substantial hardship into
account would allow for consideration of individually meritorious sit-
uations that cannot be foreseen by general legislation.
Providing access to legal status for these alien spouses and chil-
dren without the permission of their United States relatives could be
accomplished in two alternative ways. The first alternative would al-
low an alien spouse or child who fit into one of the categories de-
scribed above to file an initial relative petition herself. If the petition
is approved, she would then have the same opportunity to demon-
strate her eligibility for permanent resident status as any other
spouse or child for whom a relative petition was approved.21 5
However, alien spouses in these special circumstances should not
be put into conditional status even if their marriage is less than two
years old. There would be no need for a conditional period to assure
that the marriage was not fraudulent because the alien spouse would
have already met the burden of demonstrating that she entered into
her marriage in good faith before her petition for resident status was
215. Aliens who are the beneficiaries of approved petitions must demonstrate that
they are not excludable on various grounds, such as conviction of crimes, particular
health problems, participation in terrorist activities. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (Supp. 1991).
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approved.
This approach would have the advantage of requiring only minor
modification of the current statutory scheme. The statute would only
need to be changed to add categories of persons who could file a
relative petition. However, the current statutory scheme has some
practical disadvantages. One disadvantage would be the limitations
under the current scheme on the ability of some alien spouses to ad-
just their status to permanent resident status in the United States.21
Aliens unable to adjust status in the United States must usually re-
turn to their countries of origin to apply for permanent resident sta-
tus. Leaving the United States could impose substantial hardship on
some alien spoues or subject them to danger. For example, a bat-
tered spouse who has received an order of protection against her
abuser from a United States court would not have that protection
while she was out of the country.
A second alternative would establish a protected status for these
spouses and children. This protected status would allow them to ap-
ply expeditiously for an interim status and work authorization. This
status could then form the basis for a subsequent application for per-
manent status. This approach would have the advantage of a self
contained addition to the statute that "could be closely tailored to
meet the needs of these groups and the policy objectives of the
legislation.
An interim protected status has precedence in the immigration
law. Under the legalization program, aliens first applied for tempo-
rary resident status and then subsequently applied to adjust their
status to permanent resident.117 Also, persons seeking protection
from persecution are first given the status of asylee and subsequently
allowed to apply for adjustment to permanent resident status.21
B. Changes Needed in the Conditional Resident Scheme
Under current law, an alien spouse whose United States spouse
has petitioned for her and who has demonstrated her eligibility for
permanent resident status is given that status subject to condition if
216. See 8 U.S.C. 1254 (1988).
217. 8 U.S.C. 1255a (1988).
218. 8 U.S.C. 1159 (1988). The law also provides for temporary protected status
for aliens from certain designated countries because of conditions in their home coun-
tries, 8 U.S.C.A. 1254a, and protection against deportation and work authorization for
spouses and children of legalized aliens. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 301,
8 U.S.C.A. 1255a, Note (Supp. 1991).
her marriage is less than two years old. The condition, with some
limited exceptions, is that after a two year time period, she must
obtain the cooperation of her spouse in filing a joint petition and
attending an interview to demonstrate to INS officials that her mar-
riage was not a fraud. The conditional resident scheme thus allows a
United States spouse to transform his resident spouse, who has le-
gally lived in the United States for at least two years, into an illegal
alien.
The simple way to remove this spousal domination is to abandon a
conditional resident system. This simple approach, however, is likely
to be met with much resistance. The INS and Congress strongly be-
lieve that there is sufficient immigration-based marriage fraud to
warrant a conditional resident system. The government does not be-
lieve it has sufficient resources to ferret out fraud21 and believes it
must rely on the passage of time to identify fraud.220 Therefore, in a
concession to this political reality, the following proposals are made
to mitigate the spousal domination in the context of a conditional
resident scheme. Suggestions are made for changes in both legisla-
tion and administrative regulation.
1. Elimination of Conditional Period When There is a
Citizen Child of the Marriage
Congress should amend the law to remove the conditions attached
to an alien spouse's residency if she has a child with her U.S. spouse
and she cares for the child. If a child of the marriage is born after a
spouse petition is filed, but before the alien spouse is granted resident
status, the conditional resident scheme should not apply. The alien
spouse should become a legal permanent resident if she is otherwise
qualified, and not a conditional resident, even if the marriage is less
than two years old. If the child is born during the period of the alien
spouse's conditional residency and she demonstrates she cares for the
child, that alien spouse should be able to independently file a petition
to transform her conditional status to a permanent one.
These proposals would remove the legacy of the coverture premise
that prevents a married woman from protecting her child. It would
allow for the child's best interests to be served. These two important
objectives would be achieved without undermining the Marriage
Fraud Amendments' goal of preventing the gaining of immigration
status based on a marriage entered into for immigration fraud pur-
poses. The existence of a child of a marriage demonstrates that the
marriage was not entered into solely for the purpose of gaining an
219. See Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements, supra note 95, at 11-12
and 18.
220. See Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements, supra note 95, at 18.
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immigration status.
2. Modification of Waivers for Continuation of
Resident Status
Under the current statute there are three waivers of the require-
ment of citizen or spouse participation in the continuation of legal
status for the alien spouse: the good faith, termination waiver, the
abused spouse or child waiver, and the extreme hardship waiver.
Each waiver is subject to the Attorney General's discretion.
a. Good Faith, Termination Waiver
Until 1990, the "good faith" waiver required that an alien spouse
had entered into her marriage in good faith and had terminated the
marriage for good cause.22' The requirement that the alien spouse
terminate the marriage for good cause led to situations in which the
alien spouse had to rush to the courthouse to be the moving party in
a divorce. Further, the alien living in states having no fault divorces
had difficulty satisfying the waiver's requirements.
222
In 1990, Congress removed the requirement that the alien spouse
terminate her marriage for "good cause" from the good faith waiver.
This change allows "the alien to file independently for a waiver, if
the marriage was entered into in good faith" but still requires that
"the marriage has been terminated or termination proceedings have
commenced.1 22 Congress should also remove the "termination"
requirement.
The statute should allow an alien spouse who is attempting to
maintain her marriage to request a waiver of the joint petition, joint
interview process, if she can meet the burden of demonstrating that
she entered into her marriage in good faith and not for the purposes
of immigration fraud. The statute does not allow a conditional resi-
dent to demonstrate those facts unless the citizen or resident spouse
is willing to sign a joint petition and attend an INS interview. In
order to request the change from conditional to permanent status on
her own by showing she married in good faith, an alien spouse must
first terminate the marriage.224
221. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (1988).
222. H. R. REP. No. 723, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 54 (1990) [hereinafter
REPORT].
223. Id. at 79.
224. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
This approach does not make sense in deterring fraud. The alien
who is trying to maintain a marriage is no more likely, and probably
less likely, to have engaged in marriage fraud than an alien spouse
who has terminated the marriage. Instead of deterring fraud, the
statute allows the citizen or resident spouse to use the threat of ille-
gal status and deportation to control his alien spouse. Furthermore,
because of residency requirements for divorce in some states225 the
option to terminate a marriage within a two year period is fore-
closed. It does not make sense to hinge a good faith waiver on
whether an alien can initiate the termination of her marriage.
Changes also need to be made in the INS's interpretation of "good
faith." The statute requires only that the alien entered into the mar-
riage in good faith. Yet the INS's interpretation attempts to hinge
the alien's good faith on her citizen or resident spouse's good faith.
Furthermore, the INS does not give sufficient weight to the birth of
a child of the marriage in determining good faith.
To determine whether an alien entered into a marriage in "good
faith," the INS regulations direct the consideration of evidence re-
lating to the amount of commitment to the marital relationship by
both spouses including proof of the length of time the parties cohab-
ited, the grounds on which the marriage was terminated, and docu-
mentation demonstrating the degree to which the spouses' financial
assets and liabilities were combined.226 While length of time of the
relationship and sharing of resources may be some evidence of an
alien's good faith, by focusing on length of cohabitation and inter-
mingling of funds, the INS puts the control over whether the alien
spouse could show she entered into the marriage in good faith in the
citizen or resident spouse's hands. An alien spouse may have little
control over whether her citizen or resident spouse includes her in a
joint bank account or puts her name on a joint credit card or a lease.
She may also have little control over the length of time she lives with
her citizen or resident spouse. He may abandon her or engage in
behavior such as battering or drug abuse that forces her to leave the
marital home. It is the alien's good faith that is required by the stat-
ute, not her citizen or resident spouse's commitment to the marriage.
Good faith on the alien spouse's part should be ascertained by focus-
ing on her intent and behavior.
An INS interim regulation issued in 1991 adds birth certificates of
children born to the marriage as an example of evidence that the
marriage was entered into in good faith.227 However, proof of the
existence of a child born of the marriage should not just be a factor,
225. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 230 (McKinney 1986).
226. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(2) (1991).
227. 56 Fed Reg. 22637 (1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(2)(iii)).
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but should preclude any finding that the alien spouse did not enter
the marriage in good faith.
b. The Abused Spouse Waiver
The legislative history of the 1990 changes expressed the Congres-
sional objectives in enacting the abused spouse waiver. The House
Judiciary Committee Report stated that the purpose of the waiver
was to "ensure" that neither a spouse nor a child would be "en-
trapped in the abusive relationship by the threat of losing their legal
resident status."228 The House Judiciary Committee recognized the
particular vulnerability of victims of domestic abuse by acknowledg-
ing that in some circumstances the good faith termination waiver
would not be sufficient to meet the objective of preventing the use of
immigration law as a tool for abuse. The Committee stated that in
many cases there are obstacles to prevent a victim of domestic vio-
lence from initiating a divorce, such as fear of further physical vio-
lence or lack of resources to pay a lawyer. 2,9 On May 16, 1991, the
INS issued an interim rule that did not completely fulfill Congres-
sional intent in enacting this provision.
2 3
0
This rule first describes who is eligible for the waiver. Under the
rule the waiver may be granted to a conditional resident if she en-
tered into her marriage in good faith and she or her alien or citizen
child was battered by, or was the subject of extreme cruelty by, her
citizen or resident spouse." l The conditional resident spouse may ap-
ply for the waiver whether she is divorced, separated, or living with
the citizen or permanent resident, spouse.2" 2 This comports with leg-
islative intent to prevent the entrapment of a spouse or child in
abuse. A main proponent of the legislation, Congresswoman Slaugh-
ter, stated that the waiver would be granted to an abused conditional
resident spouse, an abused conditional resident child, or a conditional
resident spouse seeking to protect an alien or citizen child from
abuse by the citizen or resident spouse.
2 a3
The rule next discusses the meaning of "battered" and "extreme
cruelty." It describes these terms together to include, but not be lim-
228. REPORT, supra note 222, at 51, 78.
229. Id. at 51.
230. See INS Interim Rule Diminishes Protection for Abused Spouses and Chil-
dren, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 665-70 (1991).
231. 56 Fed. Reg. 22637 (1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)).
232. 56 Fed. Reg. 22637 (1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(ii)).
233. 136 CONG. REc. H8642 (daily ed., Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Slaughter).
ited to, "any act or threatened act of violence, including any forceful
detention, which results or threatens to result in physical or mental
injury." It further states that "psychological or sexual abuse or ex-
ploitation, including rape, molestation, incest ... or forced prostitu-
tion" will be considered "acts of violence. 2 34 Absent from this defi-
nition of abuse are neglect and deprivation which are criminal
offenses in many states.2 35 These should be included in the definition
of abuse. Conditional resident spouses and their children should be
able to escape from serious economic or medical deprivation without
risking deportation.
The rule further specifies the type of evidence necessary to support
the waiver. In discussing the evidence the rule separates what would
be accepted to demonstrate "physical abuse" from evidence required
to demonstrate "extreme mental cruelty." The evidence specified by
the rule as acceptable to prove physical abuse includes, but is not
limited to, reports and affidavits from police, judges, medical person-
nel, school officials, and social service agency personnel. 236 The rule's
requirement about evidence to demonstrate extreme cruelty is much
more restrictive. The rule requires that a waiver application based on
extreme cruelty must be supported by an evaluation by a licensed
clinical social worker, psychologist, or psychiatrist.237 This limitation
is not supported by the legislative history of the statute, misinter-
prets the objective of the statute, and has very serious negative con-
sequences for an alien spouse seeking a waiver based on extreme
cruelty.
The House Report made it clear that a wide variety of types of
evidence should be accepted to support the waiver application, and
that the waiver should be liberally granted. The Report gave exam-
ples of evidence that could be submitted, such as reports from police,
medical personnel, school officials, psychologists, and social service
agencies, but made it clear that it was not Congress's intent to limit
the types of evidence that could support the waiver.238 The Report
further stated the Congressional intent that the waiver be granted
when battering or cruelty is demonstrated and that the Attorney
General's discretion to deny waiver requests be limited to rare and
exceptional circumstances.239
The requirement of proof from a mental health professional to
support a waiver based on extreme cruelty misinterprets the statute.
234. 56 Fed. Reg. 22637 (1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(i)).
235. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 260.00, 260.05, 260.10 (McKinney 1989).
236. 56 Fed. Reg. 22637 (1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(iii)).
237. 56 Fed. Reg. 22637 (1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(c)(iv), (vi),
(vii)).
238. REPoRT, supra note 222, at 78-79.
239. Id.
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The statute focuses on the behavior of the citizen or ,resident spouse;
i.e., whether he engaged in extremely cruel behavior. The rule fo-
cuses on the alien spouse's response to her spouse's behavior and the
alien spouse's emotional stability. It is the United States spouse's ob-
jective behavior that is the statutory criteria, not whether the alien
spouse was so disturbed by the behavior that she sought assistance
from a mental health professional. The administrative approach pe-
nalizes an emotionally strong person who is able to withstand cruel
behavior and remain mentally and emotionally stable.
The INS's rationale for imposing such a restrictive proof require-
ment was that its officers were not qualified "to make reliable evalu-
ations of an abused applicant's mental or emotional state."240 As ex-
plained above, this focuses on the wrong issue. The relevant
determination, whether the spouse's behavior constitutes extreme
cruelty, is the type of determination INS officers are called upon to
make.24 For example, INS officers determine whether "extreme
hardship" will result from deportation of a conditional resident2 42 or
whether an asylum applicant has a "well founded fear of
persecution. '
243
The administrative interpretation also imposes an impossible prac-
tical hurdle for many women subject to extreme cruelty. An abused
woman is not likely to have resources to pay for counseling from a
mental health professional. Furthermore, at least at the initial stages
of her escape from an abusive situation, her focus is likely to be on
immediate life sustaining objectives, e.g., finding a place to stay, get-
ting a job, getting her children in school, etc.
The rule also undermines the statutory direction that confidential-
ity be preserved for the abused. 244 The rule only states that the
waiver application shall not be released without a court order or
written consent of the applicant. There are no directions about ad-
ministrative procedures to preserve the confidentiality of the applica-
tions. The rule additionally allows the release of information con-
tained in the application to an officer of the Department of Justice or
any federal or state law enforcement agency.2 45 There is no require-
ment that need be shown for the information.
240. 56 Fed. Reg. 22636 (May 16, 1991).
241. INS Interim Rule Diminishes Protection For Abused Spouses And Children,
68 INTERPRETER RELEASES No. 21, at 669 (June 3, 1991).
242. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(a)(1)(1991).
243. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9, 208.13, 208.14 (1991).
244. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (West 1991).
245. 56 Fed. Reg. 22636 (1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(vii)).
Congress recognized that abused spouses and children need to
know that if they come forward, their whereabouts will be secure
from their abusers. The INS rule, at a minimum, should specify that
under no circumstances will information be given to the abuser, that
special security measures will be taken with the application files, and
that the access of law enforcement, as well as other government offi-
cials, will be limited to those circumstances in which a need for a
specific law enforcement purpose is shown.
c. The Extreme Hardship Waiver
The INS has refused to give any direction about how it will inter-
pret "extreme hardship." The INS has stated that it will rely on
everyday meaning.z* This position conflicts with expressed Congres-
sional intent that the extreme hardship waiver be interpreted liber-
ally,241 7 particularly in circumstances involving citizen children. Fur-
thermore, the INS position is disingenuous in light of the conflicts
between INS and the courts about the meaning of extreme hardship
in the suspension context.
The legislative history of the Marriage Fraud Act shows Congres-
sional concern for the harm to a citizen child from the conditional
residency scheme. In discussing the extreme hardship waiver, the
Senate Judiciary Committee stated that "of special concern" were
cases which involved children. The Committee stated that "[i]n es-
tablishing the conditional residency provision, the Committee did not
intend to separate parents and minor children, nor did the Commit-
tee want an alien parent's resident status to be an issue in a court
decision on a custody question. 248 While the Committee states that
there might be some cases in which no hardship would result from
the deportation of a parent, it clearly viewed such a situation as an
exception. "[B]ecause of the potential difficulties inherent in family
relations" when there is a citizen child, the Committee viewed the
extreme hardship waiver provision as the "safety mechanism to en-
sure that cases in which there is genuine humanitarian need will not
be without recourse.
' 249
This strong Congressional intent has been ignored by the INS.
The INS has failed to specify that the extreme hardship waiver will
be granted in situations in which the interests of a citizen child are
involved. Furthermore, the Attorney General, through his designee,
the Board of Immigration Appeals, has interpreted the words "ex-
treme hardship" in the context of suspension of deportation very nar-
246. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,015 (Aug. 10, 1988).
247. S. REP. 491, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 8 (1986).
248. Id.
249. Id.
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rowly even in situations in which the interests of a citizen child are
involved.
250
The deportation of an alien of good moral character who has lived
in the United States for seven years can be suspended if the alien
can demonstrate that her deportation would "in the opinion of the
Attorney General" result in "extreme hardship" to the alien or her
citizen or resident spouse, parent, or child. 25' The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals has taken advantage of the language in the suspension
statute, which requires the demonstration of extreme hardship "in
the opinion of the Attorney General," to interpret extreme hardship
very restrictively.252
Several courts initially reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals
determinations of "no extreme hardship," asserting that the statute
required a broader interpretation of extreme hardship than the
Board of Immigration Appeals had given it.2 53 In INS v. Wang, the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the Attorney Gen-
eral's delegates had interpreted "extreme hardship" narrowly.
2 54
However, the Court held that because, in the suspension context, the
statute committed the definition of extreme hardship in the first in-
stance to the Attorney General's opinion, his interpretation could not
be overturned by a reviewing court because the court preferred an-
other interpretation of the statute.2 5
The controversy over extreme hardship has continued in post
Wang cases. Courts have reversed and remanded Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals decisions on the grounds that the Board of Immigration
Appeals did not consider all the evidence an alien presented or that
the Board did not consider all the adverse consequences of deporta-
250. For example, see INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); Hernandez Cordero v.
INS, 819 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1987). The fact that a citizen child would be forced to leave
the United States and be subject to a difficult adjustment and diminished educational
opportunities has not been considered extreme hardship for suspension.
251. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (a)(1) (1988).
252. For example, the Board of Immigration Appeals has stated that establishing
that deportation would result in severe economic detriment to the alien or her family is
not sufficient. See Comment, Judicial Review of 'Extreme Hardship' in Suspension of
Deportation Cases, 34 Am. U.L. REv. 175, 198 (1984); In re Gibson, 16 I. & N. Dec. 58,
59; In re Sangster, 11 I. & N. Dec. 309, 313; In re Uy, 11 1. & N. 1 Dec. 159; In re
Hwang, 10 I. & N. Dec. 448.
253. See, e.g., Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980); Barrera-Leyva v.
INS, 637 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1980).
254. INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
255. Id. See Feldman, Scope of Judicial Review: Extreme Hardship and the
Whipsaw of Illegal Aliens, 36 ADMIN. L. REv. 27 (1984); Loue, What Went Wrong With
Wang?: An Examination of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Wang, 20 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 59 (1982).
tion cumulatively in determining whether extreme hardship
existed.256
In the face of the controversy between the Board of Immigration
Appeals and the courts about the meaning of extreme hardship in
the suspension context, the INS's refusal to define extreme hardship
in the conditional resident context is disingenuous. Relying on "every
day meaning" 25' gives no meaningful guidance. As the dispute be-
tween the courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals has indi-
cated, and as the United States Supreme Court has stated, the words
"extreme hardship" are not self-explanatory.258
The INSs refusal to define what extreme hardship means in the
conditional residency context leads to the suspicion that the INS
will, on a case by case basis, interpret extreme hardship in the condi-
tional residency context as narrowly as extreme hardship is inter-
preted in the suspension context. Such an interpretation would vio-
late Congressional intent.
The waiver provision of the statute does not give the Attorney
General the same kind of authority to define extreme hardship found
in the suspension provision. The waiver provision requires that the
alien demonstrate extreme hardship, while the suspension provision
requires that the deportation would result in extreme hardship in the
Attorney General's opinion.259
There are additional good reasons for the interpretation of ex-
treme hardship in the waiver context not to follow the narrow sus-
pension approach. Aliens requesting suspension are either in illegal
status or are permanent residents who have participated in activity
that makes them deportable. Granting suspension necessitates fore-
going the enforcement objectives of the immigration laws. In con-
trast, persons requesting extreme hardship waivers under the Mar-
riage Fraud Act are aliens who obtained legal status, but whose
marriages did not last for two years, or whose spouse is using his
power over immigration status as a means of control. Granting a
waiver merely allows the alien to continue in her lawful status.
To comport with legislative history and give clear guidance about
the meaning of extreme hardship the INS must do two things. First,
the INS should explicitly state that the extreme hardship waiver will
generally be granted when a conditional resident parent demon-
strates she has a relationship with her citizen child and the child will
suffer harm if the parent is deported. Second, in its regulations inter-
preting the extreme hardship waiver the INS should list a non-exclu-
256. See, e.g., Prapavat v. INS, 662 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981); Bavanchgo v. INS,
658 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1981); Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1984).
257. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,015 (Aug. 10, 1988).
258. INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
259. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) with 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988).
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sive, but substantial, list of factors that will be taken into considera-
tion in the determination of the extreme hardship waiver. These
factors should include: family ties; need for medical care; advanced
or tender age; the political conditions in the alien's home country
that may cause difficulty for the alien or her family; the life the alien
has lived in the United States, including service of the alien to her
community; 260 a substantial decrease in standard of living because of
the alien's deportation; the unavailability of suitable employment for
the alien in her country of origin; the alien's loss of a substantial
investment in the United States; 26' and social stigma or physical
danger faced by an alien if deported. The regulation should further
make it clear that the INS will look at the factors presented in sup-
port of a waiver claim cumulatively, to ascertain the total picture of
the hardship an alien and her family would suffer from the alien's
deportation.
If the INS refuses to so clarify when the extreme hardship waiver
will apply, Congress should act. It should change the language "ex-
treme" to "substantial" to indicate that the INS may not interpret
"extreme hardship" as narrowly in the waiver context as it has been
in the suspension context. Congress should further specify that the
waiver would be generally granted in cases of harm to citizen
children.
d. The Attorney General's Discretion to Deny Waivers
The current statute requires that the citizen or alien spouse join in
a petition and appear at an interview to avoid the termination of the
alien spouse's legal status. The granting of the extreme hardship,
good faith or abuse waivers to this requirement is within the Attor-
ney General's discretion. As originally proposed, the abused spouse
waiver directed that the Attorney General "shall" grant the waiver
if the alien spouse demonstrates that she meets the waiver's requi-
sites,262 thereby removing the possibility that the INS could refuse
the waiver to a person who is fully qualified for it. This approach
should apply to all waivers. Alien spouses who meet the requisites of
the waivers of the citizen or resident spouse's required participation
should be granted those waivers. Aliens who can demonstrate they
260. H.R. REP. No. 506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1975).
261. See, e.g., Wang v. INS 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980); Hernandez-Cordero v.
INS, 783 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1986); Loue, What Went Wrong With Wang, supra note
255, at 75.
262. H.R. 2580, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
meet the criteria for the granting of the waivers should be granted
them without the INS's determining whether they "deserve" the
waiver on unspecified grounds.2"3
e. Availability of Waivers to All Alien Spouses
In 1990 Congress passed an abused spouse waiver and removed
the good cause requirement from the good faith, termination waiver.
It directed that these changes be applied to marriages that were en-
tered into before, as well as after, the law's enactment. 6 4 However,
the INS's implementing regulation limits eligibility to conditional
residents or former conditional residents who continue to live in the
United States. Although the statute specifically applied to all mar-
riages entered into before the statute was passed, the regulation
states that the waiver will not be granted to conditional residents
who departed from the United States either after their conditional
resident status terminated or under an order of deportation."" The
regulation should be changed to reflect the legislative intent for the
1990 changes to apply to all marriages.
3. The Adjustment of Status Provision
Under the Marriage Fraud Amendments, a conditional resident
cannot remain in the United States and become a legal permanent
resident other than through a change of the conditional resident sta-
tus to a permanent status. The other provisions of the immigration
law that would allow an alien in the United States who is qualified
for permanent residence to adjust to that status are denied to condi-
tional residents.26 Such a preclusion gives the citizen or resident
spouse extensive control over the immigration status of his alien
spouse and sweeps too broadly to meet the goal of preventing fraud-
ulent behavior. The conditional resident who seeks permanent resi-
dence on another basis should be given the opportunity to demon-
strate that the marriage upon which the conditional residence is
based was not fraudulent. The statute should be changed to allow
conditional residents who can demonstrate that they did not enter
into marriages for the purpose of immigration fraud and are eligible
for permanent resident status on other bases to adjust their status to
legal permanent residence.
263. To protect citizen or resident spouses from abuse by alien spouses, battering
by the alien spouse should be a disqualifying factor for waivers to the joint petition/joint
interview requirements.
264. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 701(b), 104 Stat. 4978,
5086 (1990).
265. 56 Fed Reg 22637 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. 216.5(e)(3)(ii)).
266. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(a), (d) (1988).
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4. The Review Process
A conditional resident can lose her legal immigration status in a
number of ways. The status will be terminated bWfore the end of the
two year conditional period if the INS finds the qualifying marriage
improper.267 The status will be terminated if the alien spouse and her
citizen or resident spouse do not file a joint petition 68 or appear to-
gether at an interview.269 If the alien spouse applies for a waiver of
that requirement, her legal status will be terminated if the INS deci-
sion on the waiver is adverse.2 70 If the alien and citizen spouse file a
joint petition and attend the interview, but the INS decision is ad-
verse, the alien's spouse's legal status will be terminated. 7'
Except in the situation of termination during the two year condi-
tional period, the INS does not allow any direct administrative re-
view of the termination of legal status. If the INS belives the mar-
riage was improper and proposes to terminate the alien spouse's legal
status during the two year conditional period, the alien is provided
with an opportunity to review and rebut the evidence upon which
that decision is based.272 If the INS still decides to terminate the
legal status, the alien spouse can request a review of that decision in
any deportation proceeding brought against her.
INS determinations based on purported failure to file a joint peti-
tion or appear at an interview, denials of a waiver application, or an
adverse determination on a joint petition result in termination of the
alien spouse's legal status without any opportunity for direct admin-
istrative review. 3 In those circumstances, under INS regulation, the
alien spouse will only be able to request review if and when the INS
pursues deportation proceedings.2 74 Deportation proceedings can last
many years, for reasons not under the alien's control. 5 While wait-
ing for the INS to initiate deportation proceedings, and during the
course of the proceedings, the alien spouse is an illegal alien unable
to legally work in the United States.2 6
This lack of administrative review is not mandated by the statute
267. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b) (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 216.3(a) (1991).
268. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2) (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(6) (1991).
269. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2) (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(b)(3) (1991).
270. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(0 (1991).
271. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(6) (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(d)(2) (1991).
272. 8 C.F.R. § 216.3(a) (1991).
273. 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.4(a)(6); 216.4(b)(3), 216.5(0 (1991).
274. Id.
275. REPORT, supra note 222, at 51.
276. See supra note 94.
and denies due process to the alien spouse. The statute merely guar-
antees that before INS can deport an alien spouse, she will have an
opportunity to challenge the termination of her legal status during or
after the two year conditional period as the basis for deportation.2
The statute does not, however, preclude a prior, direct, alien-initi-
ated administrative review of the termination of her legal status. An
alien spouse whose status is terminated should have the opportunity
to request an expeditious hearing before an impartial hearing officer
that focuses .only on whether the status was correctly terminated.
As persons who have gained admission to the United States and
developed the ties that go with permanent residence, conditional per-
manent residents are protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution a.21  The constitutional suf-
ficiency of procedures is evaluated by examining the interest at stake
for the individual, the risk or erroneous deprivation through current
procedures, the value of additional procedural safeguards, and the
interest of the governmental entity in using current procedures 27 9
The interest at stake for a conditional resident is very weighty. If her
status is terminated, the alien becomes an undocumented alien sub-
ject to arrest, detention, and deportation, 280 and loses her ability to
work in the United States.81 While she may raise the issue of loss of
status in the context of any subsequent deportation hearing,2 82 in the
interim, which can be lengthy, she can be detained and is forced to
live in an illegal status with no ability to support herself or her
children.
The risk of erroneous determination and the benefit of alternative
procedures is high since there is no opportunity for the applicant to
present her position orally, confront any adverse information against
her, and answer questions to clarify her claim before she is forced
into illegal status. Applicants for continuation of status, particularly
those seeking waivers, will frequently be pro se. Therefore, they gen-
erally will have little experience or skill in developing documentary
support. Furthermore, the issues relevant to the administrative deter-
mination, e.g., whether abuse occurred, are frequently best supported
by oral testimony, where the credibility of the witnesses can be as-
sessed and questions asked to clarify the events.
At the very least, the regulations should provide that when an INS
field office believes the documentary evidence is insufficient to con-
277. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(2), (c)(2)(B), (c)(3)(D) (1988).
278. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982); REPORT, supra note 222, at 78-
79. This legislative history demonstrates that Congress wants the Attorney General to
assure that victims of abuse receive this waiver.
279. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
280. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988).
281. See discussion supra note 94.
282. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(D) (1988).
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tinue the legal status, the alien spouse should have an opportunity to
present her case orally to an appropraite official and confront any
adverse information against her. She should be allowed to bring any
witnesses or other forms of evidence to support her application. 83
These procedures will impose little burden on the INS. The INS
already provides interviews of conditional resident applicants in some
circumstances 284 and has in place administrative review proce-
dures.285 Allowing the alien spouse to present her case orally when
documents are insufficient and to participate in the review proce-
dures will only assure more accurate determinations and avoid
lengthy and expensive deportation proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The spouse-based immigration laws initiated at the turn of this
century incorporated the doctrine of coverture which gave control of
a married woman's home, physical and mental well-being, livelihood,
and children to her husband. Although there was an effort in 1952 to
remove sex discrimination from the immigration laws, the result was
the perpetuation of the notion of spousal domination which was sub-
stantially strengthened by the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments of 1986. A citizen or resident spouse has extensive power over
the immigration status of his alien spouse and her children, thus con-
trolling the alien's ability to live and work in the United States and
impacting on her ability to care for her citizen or alien children.
The spousal domination perpetuated by the current immigration
laws, while facially sex neutral, has the greatest impact on women
because they are the majority of spouse-based immigrants and be-
cause, in the United States, women have historically been the target
of subordination based on sex and the victims of spouse abuse. Fur-
thermore, as is frequently the case, when women are harmed, chil-
dren are harmed as well. Both citizen and alien children suffer from
283. A cable sent by the INS to field offices directed that denials by INS field
offices of waivers based on battering or extreme cruelty be forwarded to the Central
Office for review. However the cable made no provision for notice to, or comment by, the
alien spouse denied the waiver. For all waivers, the applicant should be advised that a
recommendation of denial has been made to the Central Office and the reasons for such
recommendation. She should be given an opportunity to confront and rebut the recom-
mendation and submit to the Central Office any additional evidence to support her appli-
cation. INS IMMACT Wire #45, reproduced in 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 435-39
(1991).
284. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(d) (1991).
285. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 103.3 (1992).
the control the immigration law gives to one spouse.
Changes in legislation and administrative regulations are needed
to confront the legacies of coverture in the immigration law. Legisla-
tive changes in the process through which an alien becomes a perma-
nent resident based on marriage or parentage must be made.
Changes must also be made in both the legislation and regulations
that implement the current conditional resident scheme for alien
spouses and their alien children.
The current immigration law which allows a spouse or child of a
citizen or resident to gain legal status only when her citizen or resi-
dent chooses to file a relative petition must be changed to prevent the
use of the power to petition to create harm to innocent people and
society. Any interest in preserving a citizen or resident's right of
choice of family relationship needs to be balanced with other coun-
tervailing social concerns.
An alien who has married a citizen or resident in good faith and is
currently living in the United States should be able to gain legal
status without the citizen or resident spouse's permission if she or
her child is abused by her citizen or resident spouse, or she is the
caretaker parent of a United States citizen child born of that mar-
riage or she can meet the burden of showing she would suffer sub-
stantial hardship if deprived of legal status. Alien children abused or
abandoned by their citizen or resident parent in the United States
should have the ability to apply for legal status without the abusive
parent's participation. Spouses and children who can prove they are
in these circumstances should be granted permanent resident status
and not be subjected to the conditional resident scheme.
There are two alternative procedures which the legislature could
enact to allow these spouses and children to gain status without the
citizen or resident relative's cooperation. The current petitioning pro-
cess could be'changed to allow these particular spouses and children
to self petition. Alternatively, a protected family status that would
allow for work authorization and eventual permanent residence could
be created for these spouses and children.
A simple solution to the spouse domination in the conditional resi-
dency scheme would be to return the pre-1986 law, eliminate condi-
tional resident status and allow an alien spouse to immigrate as a
permanent resident. This solution, however, does not take into ac-
count the political reality of administrative and legislative concern
about preventing fraud. The following reforms would mitigate the
legacies of coveture while accounting for this concern.
First, when there is a child of the marriage between the alien and
United States citizen or resident spouse, the law should be changed
to allow the alien parent to protect her child. An alien parent who
cares for her child should become a permanent resident and not a
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conditional resident if the child was born before the parent's applica-
tion for immigration status was completed. Also, a conditional resi-
dent should be allowed to self petition for the change from condi-
tional to permanent status if the child was born during the
conditional residency period. These changes would allow an alien
parent the ability to protect her child. They would not raise concerns
about fraud since the existence of a child of the marriage negates
fradulent intent.
Second, changes need to be made to the three existing waivers of
the requirement of citizen or resident control of the continuation of
an alien spouse's resident status. .The good faith waiver should not
have a requirement that the marriage be terminated before the
waiver can be granted. Conditional residents struggling to maintain
their marriages, as well as those who have terminated them, should
have the opportunity to demonstrate that they did not engage in
marriage fraud to obtain permanent status. Also, whether the alien
entered the marriage in good faith should be based on the immi-
grant's commitment to the marriage, not her spouse's commitment.
The legislative intent behind the abused spouse and child waiver,
to prevent entrapment in abuse, should not be undermined by regu-
lations that narrowly restrict the evidence that can be used to
demonstrate abuse. The definition of abuse should include depriva-
tion and neglect. Furthermore, as Congress directed, the confidenti-
ality of the abused must be preserved.
The extreme hardship waiver should be interpreted liberally by
the INS, or Congress should change the word "extreme" to "sub-
stantial." Also, the INS must recognize special Congressional con-
cern about the well being of citizen children that Congress intended
to be served by the waiver. Aliens who can demonstrate that they
meet the criteria for the waivers should be granted them without the
decision being subject to the Attorney General's discretion. The INS
should recognize that the 1990 changes, which added an abused
spouse waiver and removed the good cause requirement from the
good faith termination requirement, apply to all marriages entered
into before or after these changes. Conditional residents who qualify
for permanent residence on some basis other than marriage should
be able to adjust their status if they can show they did not engage in
marriage fraud. Alien spouses whose status has been terminated
should have access to an expeditious hearing to review such
determinations.
These changes would communicate that spouse domination and
spouse abuse are not sanctioned in this society and that a parent has
the right to protect and care for her children. They are necessary to
confront the legacies of coverture in the immigration law and formu-
late laws that take into account the social situations that most fre-
quently confront women.
